



MY LEADER CSL



MY LEADER

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BEING

*An Estimate of Mr. Jinnah's Work
for Indian Mussalmans*

BY

ZIA-UD-DIN AHMAD SULERI

Author of The Road To Peace and Pakistan

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MUSLIM YOUTH
WITH THE EARNEST PRAYER
THEY WILL UNDERSTAND FULLY THE CAUSE
FOR WHICH MUSLIM INDIA IS FIGHTING, RECOGNISE
THE CRISIS THROUGH WHICH IT IS PASSING AND
APPRECIATE THE UTTER NECESSITY OF GIVING THEIR
WHOLEHEARTED AND CONSCIOUS SUPPORT TO OUR
SAVIOUR, QAID-E-AZAM MOHAMMAD ALI JINNAH, BUT
FOR WHOSE EFFORTS MUSLIM INDIA WOULD HAVE
BEEN NO MORE ON THE MAP OF
THIS COUNTRY



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PREFACE

MY LEADER is not a biography of the Qaid-e-Azam. It is strictly an estimate of his work for the Indian Mussalmans. I am quite conscious of the shortcomings of this attempt. The work requires greater details. A book of this size can hardly cover all the aspects of Qaid-e-Azam's achievements. But I have tried to take a synthetic view of the entire gamut of his work.

I own to a sense of shame that Mussalmans have not given Qaid-e-Azam's work the attention it ought to command. In my humble opinion nothing is more important to-day for the progress of Mussalmans than to know the programme of our saviour. It is only by knowing what he wants to accomplish and how has he so far achieved what is before us, that we can give him the conscious support his mission deserves. I regard Jinnah as Providence's great test for Mussalmans. If we do not know how to deserve him, we do not deserve to go ahead. If we fail him, we fail not ourselves, but also the generations to come. Jinnah stands at the most critical juncture in the history of Islam. By our conscious and sustained support of his programme, we can easily usher in a new era of Islamic renaissance; by failing him we can throw the Muslim world



back into darkness. Shall we fail him? The choice is entirely ours. It is with this feeling of utmost urgency that I have attempted this work. If I succeed in focussing the Muslim attention on Jinnah's past work and future role, I shall not have written these pages in vain.

While writing about Jinnah's work, I have been invariably drawn into discussing Gandhi's role in Indian politics in its relation to Mussalmans. I do not apologise for that. For, even as an estimate of engineers' work in erecting anew the demolished buildings of London will not be formed without knowing the extent of havoc done to them by Nazi bombs. Jinnah's work for Mussalmans is impossible to estimate unless we know beforehand the havoc Gandhi has wrought to the Muslim body-politic. Gandhi's destructive work needs must fit in the essential background of Jinnah's achievements.

I shall here take leave, to say a word of thanks to my wife, but for whose sustained co-operation all these friendless years I should not have had to-day the honour of recording—of howsoever insignificant a value—the work of Qaid-e-Azam. I hope she will pardon me for this public acknowledgment.

LAHORE

Z. A. S.

Spring 1945.



I

- "Jinnah Sahib is vain..."
- "India's political enemy Number One..."
- "Bull in China Shop..."
- "He wants to become the Dictator of India..."
- "Prouder than the proudest of Pharaohs..."
- "Would to God, he was silent for ever..."
- "...the most insufferable man."
- "Disruptor of India..."
- "He is an egoist who would own no equal..."
- "... he would let India go to hell for the sake of his communal ambition..."
- "Most unrelenting in his fanaticism..."
- "To him a Muslim is ever more precious than a thousand Hindus..."
- "Arrogant and uncompromising..."
- "An essentially bad man..."

Precisely this "proudest of Pharaohs", this "most insufferable man", this "fanatic", this "egoist," this "India's political enemy Number One", this "arrogant and uncompromising", this "Disruptor of India", this "essentially bad



man" is MY LEADER. I stand by him; I will follow him; I will lay down my life for him.

The mere fact that Jinnah is the worst man alive in the eyes of Hindus is reason enough for me to look upon him as the Man of Mussalmans.

Why has he gone down so steeply in the estimation of Hindu India? Not very long ago he was "an angel of peace" and "an ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity." Why this fall? Because Jinnah says Muslims have a right to live in India as Mussalmans and not as bond slaves of Hindus. This is Jinnah's crime. This crime has earned for Jinnah the deep gratitude of Mussalmans that they never owed to anyone ever before.

Every Mussalman whose heart burns with the desire of seeing the rebirth of Islam in India looks to Jinnah.

What has Jinnah done for Mussalmans? When such a question was put to a Turk about Kemal Ataturk he proudly answered: "Simply this: Ataturk has put Turkey back on the map of Europe!"

Jinnah has done no less for Indian Mussalmans.

It is now common knowledge that right from the time of the declining years of nine-



teenth century, European Powers were bent on dismembering the Turkish Empire. Complete plans for sharing the booty were ready. So much so that an Englishman who professed love for the East asked Turkey "not to grieve over her impending disaster but cheerfully recede from Europe." The only question was, when? Then rose a man who said: "Turkey Shall Live." And she lives.

Pre-Jinnah condition of the Indian Mussalmans was exactly the same as that of the Turks before the advent of Kemal. Leaderless, purposeless and goal-less, they were content with being mere Nationalists. When translated into the practical language of seventy-five per cent Hindu majority versus twenty-five per cent Muslim minority, this only meant perpetual slavery for the Mussalmans. And thus would have happened in India what the stubbornness of Islam had not let happen since its advent in this country.

Unlike Jainism, Buddhism, and whatever other isms that were born in India or came to India, Islam alone refused to be drowned into the nondescript, yet all-embracing and all-resolving sea of Hindudom.

Brahminism simply drove all these "isms" out of India and as a last blow to their existence, in India at least, installed their prophets



into the *gaddi* of gods. Now Budha is one of the gods of the Hindus, but Buddhism nowhere exists in India. Much as Hindus would have liked this thing to happen to Islam, it did not happen. No doubt, Hindus reached success to the extent of producing an Akbar, but no further. Every Akbar was followed by an Aurangzeb.

Islam could not be blotted out of existence in India.

But, in the post-Khilafat days, this hitherto-never-happened occurrence was very near materialising. Under the cloak of democracy, which meant one man one vote, Gandhi reached the nearest point of dealing a death blow to the existence of the Mussalmans. With the cry of 'flesh of our flesh and bones of our bones' Gandhi succeeded in replacing Islam as the first object of loyalty in the minds of Mussalmans by Hindu Nationalism. In their misery and degradation, Mussalmans began to look upon Islam as a religion which was at best a private relationship between man and his God, completely divorced from practical life—just the concept which the West had accepted on the failure of Christianity in Europe.

The completeness of Gandhi's success in de-Islamising Mussalmans could not be doubted when a stalwart Pathan whose only measure in life was "Islam or Kufr" was seen wearing

Khaddi and Gandhi cap and fast learning to appreciate the cult of non-violence. Such a staggering change in the character and make-up of Mussalmans was never conceivable. But it had taken place. The credit was entirely Gandhi's.

It was at this moment that Jinnah appeared and cried a halt to the Muslims' ignominious retreat to paganism. At first the Mussalmans who had found a new idol of Nationalism to worship were bewildered; they did not like to part with it; they had completely lost their sense of values taught by Islam. But soon, very soon indeed, the lone cry of Jinnah turned into a clarion call. It was a call to return to the original nature of a Mussalman. And they did return, returned in their thousands and in their millions and to-day all the hundred millions of them are of one creed, namely, Pakistan. Truly Iqbal said :

کیونکر خس و خاشاک سے دب جائے مسلمان
 مانا وہ تب و تاب نہیں اس کے شر میں

How can the Muslim be overpowered by sticks and straws!


Maybe he has no longer the old vigour in his flame.

This change among Mussalmans is again not simple. Ask Gandhi, he will tell you the change is incredible. He never believed it; even now he believes it only

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reluctantly. His wonder is great; his frustration equally complete. That only speaks for the greatness of Jinnah's triumph. Gandhi is a true barometer of Jinnah's success. The story of this incredible change in the Mussalmans is the story of Jinnah's work, mission and success.

But Jinnah's work for Mussalmans cannot be truly estimated without having a peep into the recent history of Mussalmans—without taking into account the critical periods through which they have passed to reach their present position in Indian politics. I shall, therefore, touch on some of the salient aspects of the recent Muslim history in order to bring out the background against which Jinnah started on his stupendous work of reorganising Mussalmans into a separate and distinct identity. If the reader bears with me in this preliminary study of the situation Jinnah was called upon later to handle, I am sure he will be better able to appreciate Jinnah's mission in our times.



Qaid-e-Azam and Sir Stafford Cripps after their
 • meeting in 1942.



II

"...the real greatness of the man (Sir Sayyed) consists in the fact that he was the first Indian Muslim who felt the need of a fresh orientation of Islam and worked for it... his sensitive nature was the first to react to modern age..."

—*Iqbal*

I shall here consider only two periods which I deem to be the most critical through which Mussalmans have had to pass. The first period begins from the day of the consolidation of the British position in India and terminates in the rise of Sir Sayyed and the formation of the All-India Muslim League in 1906. The characteristic feature of this period is the policy of systematic suppression of Mussalmans which the British pursued. This policy resulted in the levelling down of the Mussalman nobility almost to the state of fishermen. No measure was spared to paralyse their position. The tale is too long and I do not propose to relate it. The condition of object misery to which the Mussalmans were reduced is mirrored in the following petition which the Orissa Mussalmans addressed to the Queen-Empress.

"Born of noble parentage (the petition



runs) poor by profession, and destitute of patrons, the Orissa Mohammadans have been levelled down and down with no hope of rising again . . . The penniless condition which we are reduced to, consequence of our loss of former Government service, has thrown us into such an everlasting despondency, that we would travel to the remotest corners of the earth, ascend the snowy peaks of the Himalaya, wander to the forlorn regions of Siberia, could we be convinced that by so travelling we would be blessed with a Government appointment of ten shillings a week."¹

No wonder by 1870 the Mussalman houses of Bengal had either disappeared from the earth or had been submerged beneath the new strata of society which the new regime had developed. "A hundred and seventy years ago," Sir William Hunter says, "it was impossible for a well-born Mussalman in Bengal to be poor; at present it is almost impossible for him to continue rich." Deprived of their land by the enactment of Permanent Settlement Act,² driven out of the educational field by the substitution of Persian and Urdu by English, thrown out of the Army and debarred from

¹ Sir William Hunter : *Indian Mussalmans*.

² Mr. James O' Kinely, an authority on the Permanent Settlement says :

"It elevated the Hindu collectors, who up to that time had held but unimportant posts, to the position of landholders, gave them a proprietary right in the soil, and allowed them to accumulate wealth which would have gone to the Mussalmans under their own rule." (Quoted by Asoka Mehta and Achyut Patwardhan in *The Communal Triangle in India*).



entering the services,¹ the Mussalmans had felt completely lost.

This was one aspect of the British policy. The other was of bountiful patronage to the Hindu brethren. "It was with the help of Hindus," say Achyut Patwardhan and Asoka Mehta, "that the English overwhelmed the Muhammadans' power."² The commercial and Hindu bourgeois of Bengal were used to crush the feudal Muslim aristocracy there.³ This policy was universally followed. The Jain and Hindu merchants in other parts of India vied with each other in helping the British to establish their rule in this country.⁴

Is it then strange that this deliberate

¹ "In fact there is now scarcely a Government office in Calcutta in which a Muhammadan can hope for any post above the rank of porter, messenger, filler of ink-pots and mender of pens."—*Indian Mussalmans*.

² *The Communal Triangle in India*.

³ Mr. S. C. Hill in his *Introduction to Bengal in 1756-1757*, observes:

"Thus, we find that the partisans of the British were almost all Hindus or proteges of the Hindus... The fact that the commerce and manufactures of the country were almost entirely in the hands of the Hindus naturally brought them into close connection with the European merchants, who had settled in the country for the purpose of trade, and so produced a kind of tacit alliance based mainly upon their material interests. (*Ibid*)

⁴ T. S. Shejwalkar in his *Native Support of the British Dominion in India* says:

"They were thought to be so important and treated with such confidence that they had interviews with high British officials on the very day of their arrival, just as men of high station go to receive a Governor or a Viceroy in these days."



discrimination in the British treatment of Hindus and Muslims caused a wide gulf between the two people? The Hindus pushing onward and the Muslim sinking down. So that we find by 1857, while the socio-political movement of Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Ramakrishna, Dayanand and others had awakened in the minds of Hindus, a consciousness of their growing political strength, identity of aim, singleness of outlook, the Muslims were at the bottom of degradation. It is an irony of fate that they had also to undergo the sufferings of the post-Mutiny barbarities. In their utter misery they hardly needed to be further pushed into the vast sea of degeneration, but they were.

It is admitted now that the British wrath had wrongly but fully spent itself on the Mussalmans, because it was thought that the Mussalmans were the instigators of the Mutiny. The interpretations on that event have now suffered a change, and British apologists make it out that they were wrong in picking out the Muslims for their vengeance. Obviously SOMEONE HAD BLUNDERED, but it is hardly any consolation to the Muslim community who suffered terribly and continued to suffer for long. "There was no calamity in those days which was not attributed to the Muslims without minding that its originators might be the followers of Ram



Din and Mata Din and there is no doubt that any calamity which fell from the firmament might not have come straight to some Muhammadan house bringing ruin and destruction.”¹ Indeed there was no misfortune “which descended from heaven to the earth which did not seek for its resting place the dwellings of Muhammadans.”

This only shows that the tide of suppression which sprang from the British rise to power in India and gained momentum during the Wahabi Movement, had reached its high water-mark at the great Fall of Mutiny. Ever a political suspect, the Muslim had now become a political criminal. “There was no prickly plant in those awful times respecting which it was not said it was planted by Muhammadans.”²

It is at this point of Indian history when the century-long prosperity and patronage of the new Power had made the Hindus solid, strong, educated and what is more conscious of their political rights on the one hand while the century-long suppression had thrown the Muslims into the very mire of misery on the other, that we find a saviour appear on the horizon of Muslim India, namely, Sayyed Ahmad Khan.

Sir Sayyed had lived through those “awful

¹ Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan.

² *Ibid.*



times" and had been a witness to what had happened to Mussalmans and knew what was further in store for them. He made frantic efforts to arrest the overflowing tide of suppression against Mussalmans. He addressed the British rulers on the plight of Mussalmans and pleaded with them that it was not the instigation of Mussalmans alone that had brought about the Mutiny. The reason lay in the general discontent of the people, of which the British rulers were blessedly ignorant. His earnest pleading yielded result. In the words of C. F. Andrews "... he (Sir Sayyed) struck the right note at the right time by his public pronouncement that his own Muslim people had been unfairly treated. His appeal went home because it came from the depth of his own heart."¹ So Sir Sayyed arrested the progress of the tide of suppression, but the tide did not run quite dry; it only began to flow in narrower channels.

Paying a tribute to the great Muslim leader, Sir Theodore Morrison quotes a friend of Sir Sayyed saying of him on his death: "Other men have written books and founded colleges; but to arrest, as with a wall, the degeneration of a whole people—that is the work of a prophet." More apt words could not be found to estimate the services of Sir Sayyed to Mussalmans. It is indeed like a wall that he

¹ *The Rise and Growth of Congress.*



stopped the degeneration of the Mussalmans.

Soon he busied himself in planning for the education of Mussalmans. He was convinced that the regeneration of Mussalmans lay in education and that too of Western type. He created a storm of opposition by his ideas amongst his own people, but he stuck fast to them. He was also firm in his opinion that Muslim degeneration was equally due to the Mulla's bigotted boycott of English ideas and education and so founded the Great Institution of Aligarh, which since then has been the seat of Muslim political thoughts and renascent movements in Islam.

There was yet another important aspect of the Muslim situation to which Sir Sayyid devoted his attention. (The stupendous nature of Sir Sayyid's work makes it impossible to over-emphasise the importance of any of its aspects.) The third aspect to which he attended was political. We have pointed out that a century-long prosperity and patronage had made the Hindus strong. Their English education had made them demand rights in the government of the country according to the Western concept of democracy. This awakening had culminated in the foundation of the Indian National Congress. The aim of the Congress, as the circular issued for its first meeting put it, was "to form a native Parliament" to reply to the assertion that "India is wholly unfit for any



form of representative institution."

What was Sir Sayyed's attitude to this development? Far from being averse to the political advancement of the country, he had many a time pleaded for the organisation of Indian opinion "to speak out openly and honestly ... as to the justice or otherwise of the acts of the Government." In fact he had pleaded for agitation for India's rights in England and thus apprise the British Parliament of her conditions, her rights and her aspirations. "Can you expect that body," he once said, "to take a deep interest in your affairs if you do not lay your affairs before it?" He wanted this because he was sensitive to the racial discrimination in which the British were indulging. The behaviour of English officers towards Indians had often aroused his indignation.

"Now in the first years of the British rule in India, the people were heartily in favour of it. This good feeling the Government has now forfeited and the natives very generally say that they are treated with contempt. A native gentleman is in the eyes of any petty official, as that official esteems himself lower than a Duke. The opinion of many of these officials is that no native can be a gentleman. However good the intentions of the Government with regard to the subjects may be, unless these officials have practical proofs thereof by kind treatment of the natives, the people will not believe them. Theory and practice are not one



and the same.

Yet such a man—in the present political parlance a “nationalist”—opposed the idea of Mussalmans joining the Indian National Congress.

What were his reasons? C. F. Andrews says: “Sir Sayyed Ahmad from the first had stood out against any close amalgamation with the Congress. He held with all the strength of a life-long conviction that the *Muslims in India must stand by themselves and work out their own salvation as a community with the help of the British rulers.*”¹


Whether or not with British help, Sir Sayyed wanted Mussalmans to stand by themselves and work out their own salvation as a community. And, is it any wonder that Sir Sayyed thought in these terms? For, apart from being different in outlook, were not the Mussalmans totally and visibly different from the Hindus in circumstances? The one community had at its back a century-long prosperity and education, while the other had a century-long suppression and ignorance. How could the interests of the two be the same? How could the two respond to a situation alike? The simple fact that the proceedings of the Congress were conducted in the English language ruled out Muslim participation. For how many Muslims were

¹ *The Rise and Growth of Congress.*



conversant with the language itself ?

We have seen that Sir Sayyed was no flunkey or anything of that kind. He had boldly and clearly criticised the British at times when no Muslim could open his mouth without provoking the severest consequences. Yet he advised the Mussalmans to keep aloof from the Congress because it was in their interests to do so. The only consideration that dictated his policy was the interests of Mussalmans. When Hindus accuse Sir Sayyed and others who followed him in this policy as being pro-Government or anti-Nationalist, they only mean to say that Sir Sayyed did not follow the dictates of the Hindus. This involves a fundamental point. Suppose it were asked why did not Hindus start Congress in 1830? Or why did not Congress demand independence in 1885? The obvious reply would be that the people—that is, Hindus—were not mature for it. Sir Sayyed's argument was the same in the year 1885—the Mussalmans were not mature for pursuing the kind of agitation Hindus were preparing to pursue. The Hindus have no patience with this contention. Here they bring the pressure of their overwhelming majority to bear on the issue and declare the Muslims flunkies, anti-nationalist and what not. That only means that while Hindus have the right to determine their steps in the light and the



Qaid-e-Azam addressing the gathering on Iqbal Day celebrated at the Punjab University Hall, Lahore, in 1940.



suitability or otherwise of circumstances, Muslims have not. They must simply follow the majority regardless of the danger involved to their existence. By his determined act, Sir Sayyed asserted the Muslims' right to think for themselves. He was not ashamed to profess that his first loyalty was to Mussalmans and it was this supreme loyalty which shaped his policy and programme.

Reverting to what C. F. Andrews had to say about Sir Sayyed's policy: "In the origin and foundation of the Congress Sir Sayyed Ahmad seems to have taken no part. He was entirely absorbed in the work of his College at Aligarh. He had at first to break down the hostility of the Europeans. For, as we have seen, the strong conviction prevailed that the outbreak of rebellion was the last effort of the Moghul Emperor in Delhi, in conspiracy with Muslims in other places, to restore, in some form or other the Muslim rule. All this seems to have been entirely imaginary for the revolt broke out owing to entirely different causes. But *clouds under which the whole Muslim world in India remained were not really dispersed* until the singularly striking personality of Sir Sayyed Ahmad brought conviction to the minds of those in authority that their fears had been groundless and that it was, to say the least, bad policy to drive



Muslims to despair.”¹

Yes, it was these clouds which hovered over the Mussalmans—clouds which had never over-shadowed the life of Hindus—which determined Sir Sayyed’s policy. Having rescued them from the clutches of a century-long tyrannical policy Sir Sayyed was loath to reopen the flood-gates of suppression. For, to all intents and purposes, Mussalmans were still political suspects. Any course of action which sought to line them up against the Government was suicidal. Hence the Mussalmans—the great leader decided—should take their own time to muster up strength and demarcate their line of action.

Moreover, Sir Sayyed did not believe in any anti-Government agitation for a pro-founder reason. Since the time the British became the paramount power in India, Mussalmans had fashioned their policy on the principle that India by virtue of foreign rule had become *Dar-ul-Harab* and so they should either migrate to some other land or turn out the British. This anti-Government attitude inevitably involved boycott of English education and Western thoughts. Sir Sayyed, on the contrary, was convinced that the only way to break the 500-year-old stagnation of Muslim thought—the fact was most of

¹ *The Rise and Growth of Congress.*



all responsible for the distintegration of Islam all over the world—was the establishment of close contact between Islam and Western thought and science. Unless reorientation of thought in Islam was effected after a patient study of modern learning, the birth of a renascent Islam was impossible. Indeed, he thought that Indian Mussalmans had the first opportunity of boldly trying what the Mussalmans in other Muslim lands governed by the un-Islamic institution of kingship could not do. It was by a movement in thought that Mussalmans could receive fresh impetus for action and new energy of life. Motivated by this desire he was opposed to all moves which would distract Mussalmans from education, to the acquisition of which they had not applied themselves so long ago.

Sir Sayyed's attitude to the Congress was not born of any hostility towards Hindus or of feelings of loyalty to the British, but solely of the reason that he wanted Mussalmans to get the chance to rethink their thoughts. Any anti-Government agitation in the case of Mussalmans would inevitably throw them back to reactionary movements against Western thoughts, apart from the sufferings involved in such a move for them. He would not hazard this. And in this he was manifestly correct. Thus Sir Sayyed



Ahmad's decision to keep aloof from the Congress movement constitutes the first and foremost step of Muslim self-determination in India.

There was yet another snag in Congress politics which did not escape Sir Sayyed's keen perception. Schooled in Western thoughts, aspiring to possess British political institutions, the Hindu leaders were demanding democratic self-government. What did it mean? It meant Government by the people on the principle of election. One man one vote. That is, majority rule, which is bound to be of Hindus. What chance had Mussalmans to compete in such an unequal race? None. Therefore, for the introduction of representative institution in India as it stood, Sir Sayyed unhesitatingly opposed the 'election' principle. Undoubtedly he was judging the whole question from the Muslim standpoint and this is why he was determined to see that the Mussalmans did not embroil themselves in any movement which would throw them to post-Mutiny conditions.

And did the Mussalmans listen to his advice? Let C.F. Andrews speak again: "... his decision to oppose the Congress and his advice to hold aloof from it received after his death in 1898 almost a religious sanction. In the north of India his counsel prevailed



and his verdict was quoted as sacrosanct for a whole generation.”¹ The Mussalmans followed his advice as one man. The manifest correctness of Sir Sayyed’s attitude is underlined by Maulana Mohamed Ali’s reference to the conditions that beset Sir Sayyed when he issued his advice. “Be it remembered that the man who enunciated this policy was not at the time a *persona grata* to the major portion of the community which he sought to lead. He was hated as a heretic because of the heretodoxy of his aggressive rationalism in interpreting the Holy Quran and his militant opposition to popular superstitions believed in by the bulk of the orthodox and to shackling customs consecrated by time, though wholly unauthorised by Islam. He was abused and vilified by hundreds of thousands of his co-religionists, and for long the college that he founded at Aligarh was the *bete noire* of the pious Muslim. And yet the entire community followed his political lead without a murmur. Neither fallacious arguments nor even political clap-trap could have possessed such potency, and it is my firm belief that his advocacy succeeded mainly because of the soundness of the policy he advocated.”

Sir Sayyed has not left anyone in doubt as to why he pursued this policy. He

¹ *The Rise and Growth of Congress.*



frankly believed, and said so, that the principle of election, pure and simple, did not suit India's heterogeneous conditions and was hurtful to Mussalmans. He fully spoke his mind on the occasion of the C. P. Local Self-Government Bill in the Council of the Governor-General of India in 1883, and the importance of the issue calls for a fuller quotation of that speech.

India (Sir Sayyed said) a continent in itself, is inhabited by vast population of different races and different creeds: the rigour of religious institutions has kept even neighbours apart: the system of caste is still dominant and powerful. In one and the same district the population may consist of various creeds and various nationalities; and, whilst one section of the population commands wealth and commerce, the other may possess learning and influence. One section may be numerically larger than the other and the standard of the enlightenment which one section of the community has reached may be far higher than that attained by the rest of the population. One community may be fully alive to the importance of securing representation on the local boards and district councils, whilst the other may be wholly indifferent to such matters.

Under these circumstances, it is hardly possible to deny that the introduction of representative institutions in India will be attended with considerable difficulty and socio-political risks. In a country like England, where the distinctions of race no longer exist, where the differences of sectarianism in



religious matters have been mitigated by the advance of toleration, the matter does not present such difficulties. The community of race and creed makes the English people one and the same nation, and the advance of education has rendered smaller differences wholly insignificant in matters connected with the welfare of the country at large. Christian constituencies do not object to return Jews to represent their interests in Parliament, and, indeed, for socio-political purposes, it may be said that the whole of the population of England forms but one community. It is obvious, of course, that the same cannot be said of India. *The system of representation by election means the representation of the views and interests of the majority of the population, and, in countries where the population is composed of one race and one creed, it is no doubt the best system that can be adopted. But, my Lord, in a country like India, where there is no fusion of the various races, where religious distinctions are still violent, where education in its modern sense has not made an equal or proportionate progress among all the sections of the population, I am convinced that the introduction of the principle of election, pure and simple, for representation of various interests on the local boards and the district councils, would be attended with evils of greater significance than purely economic considerations. So long as differences of race and creed and the distinctions of caste form an important element in the socio-political life of India, and influence her inhabitants in matters connected with the administration and welfare of the country at large, the system of election, pure and simple, cannot be safely adopted. The larger community would totally over-ride the interests*



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of the smaller community and the ignorant public would hold Government responsible for introducing measures which might make the differences of race and creed more violent than ever. My Lord, I have dwelt upon this matter at such length in order to explain why I, a sincere admirer of the representative system have given my cordial support to such provisions of this Bill as appear to militate against the system of election, pure and simple. Government, in reserving to itself the power of appointing one-third of the members of the local boards and district councils, is adopting the only measure which can be adopted to guarantee the success of local self-government, by securing and maintaining that due and just balance in the representation of the various sections of the Indian population which the system of election, pure and simple, would fail to achieve.

We are now in a position to arrive at a correct appraisal of Sir Sayyed's attitude towards the Congress. Primarily he wanted the Mussalmans to stand by themselves and work out their destiny in the light of their own peculiar needs and principles of conduct. Secondly, the Mussalmans were not educationally and materially yet in a fit condition to demand rights which they were not in a position to exercise. Thirdly, whatever political activity it was necessary to engage in ought to be determined in the light of the Muslims' own peculiar position in India's body-politic. For the first time Mussalmans were adjusting themselves to the requirements



of modern times and that could be their only attitude. It is the great fortune of the Mussalmans that at the critical time when India was for the first time experiencing political consciousness in the modern sense, they had a leader of the genius of Sir Sayyed to guide their steps.

It was due to this fundamental clarification of the Muslim position that Mussalmans were able to organise themselves separately and demand the right to be represented separately on the eve of the introduction of the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909.

The Simla Deputation, organised to wait on the Viceroy, Lord Minto, to demand separate electorates, was immediately followed by the foundation of the All-India Muslim League in 1906. With this ends the first critical period of the Mussalmans.

Recapitulating the features of this period, they are : first, the systematic suppression of Mussalmans and their consequent degeneration ; second, its stoppage by the herculean efforts of Sir Sayyed and the commencement of an educational programme, and lastly and most important of all, the laying down of an independent policy for the political advancement of Mussalmans. The Muslims were not only rescued from the wrath of the British but also from submergence into Hindudom.



III

"To the Mussalmans, Swaraj means, as it must mean, India's ability to deal effectively with the Khilafat question."
—Gandhi.

From 1906 to 1916, the Mussalmans maintained their progress on an even kneel. They were fast making up their deficiency in education, improving their material position and slowly but surely chalking out their policy in the political field.

This steady move towards self-determination met its full consummation in the Lucknow Pact which the Muslim League entered into with the Congress in 1916.

I say the Muslim move towards self-determination met its full consummation in this Pact, because, so far, it was the British who had (through the Government of India Act of 1909) recognized the separate political identity of the Mussalmans; through this Pact the great Hindu community also reckoned the Mussalmans as a separate political entity. Henceforth the Muslim League was the accredited spokesman of the millions and millions of Mussalmans, in their dealings



both with the British and the Hindus and henceforth in it resided the incontrovertible right of the Mussalmans to determine their line of thought and course of action. This is the most important point in this Pact.

Another important feature of this Pact is the underlying identity of views of Hindus and Mussalmans regarding the political advancement of the country. The Mussalmans, as much—if not more—desired the independence of India as did the Hindus. In the face of this Pact, it is indeed surprising how in recent years the Congress propaganda machinery had the audacity to declare the Muslim League a flunkey and pro-Government organisation, while making out Congress a pro-freedom organisation. The Pact shows in unmistakable terms that either both the organisations are pro-Government or both of them are aspirants to freedom:

Now I shall pass on to the study of the second critical period, through which the Mussalmans passed, before I come to the Jinnah Era. I reckon this period from the date the Khilafat Agitation was started, that is, 1919, until almost 1934.

From the Muslim point of view, this period produced the most fundamental and revolutionary change in their politics. That change consists in this: while in 1916 we see the Muslim League as the authoritative and repre-



representative organisation of the Mussalmans, entering into a pact with the Congress in the inter and post-Khilafat days the League is nowhere to be seen. On the contrary the Congress emerges as the most powerful organisation.

How did this stupendous change come about? How was the quarter-century long effort to establish the separate political identity of Mussalmans brought to nought? The story of this change is remarkable. And here I propose to relate it. The story makes for clarity of views on the Hindu-Muslim tension as it arose since 1937, and as far as I know, has not really been told.

If I were asked to name one man who is the author of this change, I shall not be found wanting in a quick and definite answer. The man is Gandhi.

How, I shall presently state.

What was the Khilafat Agitation? The objective of the movement was twofold: to preserve the Khilafat and to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire. I am here not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the basis of the movement.¹ All I say

¹ Discussing the Islamic institution of Ijtihad in its application to Caliphate, the late Allama Iqbal says in *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* :

"Let us now see how the Grand National Assembly has exercised this power of Ijtihad in regard to the institution of Khilafat. According to Sunni Law the appointment of an



is that it was a great movement. Never in the modern political history of Indian Mussalmans were they so challengingly aroused to a consciousness of their unity of thought in India. The moment unleashed an unprecedented amount of energy among the Mussalmans. But what it came to—that is the question.

The most significant feature of the movement was the participation of Gandhi and his guidance of its direction. The first question that arises in the mind is: what was Gandhi's motive in joining the movement? Admittedly, the Khilafat movement was based on religious sentiments. It was avowedly pan-Islamic in its contents. Is it not strange that the same Gandhi who in 1944 goes out of his way to ask Jinnah whether the goal of Pakistan was Pan-Islam should have joined the Khilafat Movement in 1919 with such enthusiasm as to shock both the Mussalmans and Hindus, pleasantly and otherwise. Hence the question: What was the motive of Gandhi?

Imam or Khalifa is absolutely indispensable. The first question that arises in this connection is this. Should the Caliphate be vested in a single person? Turkey's Ijtihad is that according to the spirit of Islam the Caliphate or Immate can be vested in a body of persons, or an elected Assembly. The religious doctors of Islam in Egypt and India, so far as I know, have not yet expressed themselves on this point. Personally, I believe the Turkish view is perfectly correct. It is hardly necessary to argue this point. The republican form of government is not only thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam, but has also become a necessity in view of the new forces that are set free in the world of Islam."



Explaining his attitude to the Khilafat Movement, he told his Hindu critics that in it was "an opportunity of uniting Hindus and Muhammadans as would not arise in a hundred years." Judging however from the concrete consequence of the Khilafat Agitation, namely, the disappearance of the Muslim League, the only motive Gandhi could have in joining a movement ideologically so antithetical was to utilise the energy of the movement in destroying the separate political identity of Mussalmans which had been established by the Muslim League. Further, in intermixing the Congress with the Khilafat he utilised the power generated by the Khilafat Agitation in strengthening the Congress. Paraphrasing Gandhi's "Unity" statement in the light of these twin-results, it could only mean the destruction of the Mussalmans' separate entity and its complete absorption into Hindudom.

I accuse Gandhi of destroying the quarter-century-long effort of the Muslim leaders to establish the separate identity of Mussalmans in the political field. My accusation is based on facts.

Gandhi may be said to have appeared on the Indian scene on 2nd March, 1919 with the manifesto he issued to launch passive resistance against the Rowlatt Bills.

What had he observed in India on his



return from South Africa after earning the name of a saint was that politics in India had two visible contours—one was Muslim, the other Hindu. The Muslims were represented by the Muslim League and Hindus by the Congress. He was faced with the solid fact of separate Muslim identity. That was discomforting. That did not augur well for the Hindus. 'What is the use of learning the lesson of democracy, that is majority rule, (the Mahatma must have said to himself) if Hindus do not have the Muslim minority under control. And by the established fact of Muslim self-determination in politics, the very concept of Hindu Raj in India had been brought to naught. Couldn't something be done? No. How foolish of these people to have come to pact with the Muslim League. Well what is done is done. The point is how to undo it.'

And so the genius of Gandhi set itself to the task of undoing what Sir Sayyed and his followers had done, and the British and the Congress had confirmed. Henceforth he was lying in wait, scheming to achieve his objective.

He did not have to wait for long. There came the Khilafat Agitation. In its vast dimensions, the Khilafat Agitation completely drowned the Muslim League—the Muslim League, which nurtured in the Sir Sayyed school of




thought was pursuing a line of consolidating the Mussalmans in India without coming into conflict with the Government. It was impossible for it to control the exuberance of the Khilafatists. Henceforth the Muslim League had to resign itself to a subsidiary role—almost no role, but watch and see.

To Gandhi it was the chance of a life time. 'In a hundred years such a moment of uniting Hindus and Mussalmans into a single nation would not come!' So raced his thoughts. Muttering to himself: 'There is a tide in the affairs of men...' he rode the tide of Muslim fury against the British and directed it against the Mussalmans themselves.

Joining the Khilafatists, he at once constituted himself their leader. It was he who made the Khilafatists adopt the Non-Co-operation Movement and it was the Khilafat Movement which used it first. Congress merely endorsed what the Khilafat Committee had resolved, namely, to launch a non-co-operation movement under the personal guidance of Gandhi.¹

¹ Ambedkar in his *Thoughts on Pakistan* says:

"On the 9th June 1920 the Khilafat Conference met at Allahabad and unanimously reaffirmed their resolve to resort to Non-co-operation and appointed an Executive Committee to enforce and lay down a detailed programme. On 22nd June 1920 the Muslims sent a message to the Viceroy stating that they will start Non-co-operation if the Turkish grievances were not redressed before 1st August 1920. On the 30th June 1920,



Qaid-e-Azam and Mr. Gandhi before proceeding to meet
the ex-Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow.



This is the first point which is to be noted about Gandhi's tactics of converting the Khilafat Agitation to his own purpose.

He knew full well that nothing would come out of the movement. Only destruction and demoralisation were in store for the Mussalmans. But wasn't that just the end he had in view? And that explains why he threw himself so whole-heartedly into the movement.

The Non-Co-operation Movement involved a gigantic boycott of everything British. Not merely were the new voters urged to stay away from the polls, and thus elect no members to the proposed legislative bodies, but lawyers and litigants were to avoid the courts, tax-payers refuse to pay imposts, workmen to go on strike, shopkeepers to refuse to buy or sell British-made goods, and even pupils to leave the schools and colleges. And further, in the case of Mussalmans, it involved *hijrat*, migration from India—just the thing Hindus desire and declare: 'Either go out of India or live under us.'

It is on record that Maulana Mohamed

the Khilafat Committee meeting held at Allahabad resolved to start Non-Co-operation after a month's notice to the Viceroy. Notice was given on the 1st August 1920 and the Non-co-operation commenced on 21st August 1920. This short resume shows that the Non-Co-operation was started by the Khilafat Committee and all that the Congress Special Session at Calcutta did was to adopt what the Khilafat Conference had already done...



Ali, who was in England during those days, disapproved of this method of boycott when he returned to India. Here is Jawaharlal's testimony: "Mohamed Ali was in Europe then on a Khilafat Deputation. On his return he also expressed regret at the method of boycott adopted; he would have preferred the Sinn Fein way." "But," Jawaharlal adds, "it was quite immaterial what other individuals thought in the matter, as ultimately Gandhiji's view was bound to prevail. He was the author of the movement, and it was felt that he must be given freedom as to the details."¹ So Gandhiji had perfect freedom to direct the movement. And making full use of his powers, he hurled the Mussalmans into a bloody war against the British and let them meet the consequences. From Gandhi's standpoint it was not a war against the British, it was a war against Islam that had throughout the centuries refused to be sunk into the sea of Hindudom.

Gandhi was careful that the Congress should align itself with the Khilafat Agitation. The Hindus were frankly not prepared to do such a thing. What interest could they possibly have for a Pan-Islamic Khilafat and the safety of Islam? So the resolution of Non-Cooperation was passed only by a bare majority at the Calcutta Congress Session. And that

¹ *Autobiography.*



too, as Dr. Ambedkar relates the story in his *Thoughts on Pakistan* told him by the late Mr. Tairsee "a large majority of the delegates were no others than the taxi-drivers of Calcutta who were paid to vote for the Non-Co-operation resolution." It was so arranged because Gandhi was none too sure of the support of the *short-sighted* Hindus. Nothing could be left to chance. 'If the Hindus do not themselves understand the implication of my move, well, let arrangements be made for the contingency!' And so you have the spectacle of paid voters vying with each other to vote for sacrifice, Khilafat and Non-Co-operation. Everything was well-planned. Planning is Gandhi's strongest point.

The Congress was brought in chiefly to gather the spoils of the war when the Muslims had broken down. And who can say it neglected its duty. "The effect of its taking up the Khilafat cause upon the dimensions of the Congress was tremendous," says Dr. Ambedkar. "THE CONGRESS WAS REALLY MADE GREAT AND POWERFUL NOT BY THE HINDUS BUT BY THE MUSLIMS. AFTER THIS RESOLUTION THE MUSLIMS WHO WERE OUTSIDE IT TROOPED IN THE CONGRESS AND THE CONGRESS HINDUS IN TURN WELCOMED THEM."¹ Thus,

¹ Swami Shardhanand records in *Liberator* of 22nd March, 1926 :



here was performed the miracle which Gandhi's predecessors could not perform in Sir Sayyed's time. And now when Muslims had joined the Congress, arose the inevitable, but premeditated, question: Was there any need for a communal organisation like the Muslim League? The answer was obvious: *None whatsoever except to please the Government.* So the deadly argument took its birth.

The Mussalmans have been charged with approaching the Afghans to invite them to invade the country. The charge remains

"On sitting on the *dais* (Lucknow Congress platform), the first thing that I noticed was that the number of Muslim delegates was proportionately fourfold of what it was at Lahore in 1893. The majority of Muslim delegates had donned gold, silver and silk embroidered *chogas* (flowing robes) over their ordinary coarse suits of wearing apparel. It was rumoured that these *chogas* had been put by Hindu moneyed men for Congress *Tamasha*. Of some 433 Muslim delegates only some 30 had come from outside, the rest belonging to Lucknow City. And of these the majority was admitted free to delegates' seats, board and lodging. Sir Sayyed Ahmad's Anti-Congress League had tried in a public meeting to dissuade Muslims from joining the Congress as delegates. As a counter-move the Congress people lighted the whole Congress camp some four nights before the session began and advertised that night would be free. The result was that all the *Chandu Khanas* of Lucknow were emptied and a huge audience of some thirty thousand Hindus and Muslims was addressed from half a dozen platforms. It was then that the Muslim delegates were elected or selected. All this was admitted by the Lucknow Congress organiser to me in private.

"A show was being made of the Muslim delegates. A Muslim delegate gets up to second a resolution in Urdu. He begins: 'Hazarat. I am a Muslim delegate.' Some Hindu delegate gets up and calls for three cheers for Muslim delegates and the response is so enthusiastic as to be beyond description." (Quoted by Ambedkar in his *Thoughts on Pakistan*.)



unproved. But there was Gandhi breathing fire and brimstone for the cause of Islam. Answering to the Hindu critics to whom the idea of Muslim alliance with Afghanistan was galling, Gandhi wrote in his *Young India* of 4th May 1921 : "I would, in a sense, certainly assist the Amir of Afghanistan if he waged war against the British Government. That is to say, *I would openly tell my countrymen that it would be a crime to help a Government which had lost the confidence of the nation to remain in power.*" This was an instigation to the Mussalmans to go on in that direction. He knew the price the Mussalmans would have to pay for that. He had not read the history of the Mutiny for nothing. That the Afghans would not dare flirt with the idea of attacking India he was perfectly aware. Not too long ago he had declared : *British forces are too well-organised to admit of any successful invasion of the Indian Frontier.* Therefore, by declaring such intentions he was not running the risk of encouraging the invasion of his dear motherland, but was only making sure that the *Muslim conspirators* were properly dealt with. Clearly, the evil intention was to perpetrate the post-Mutiny barbarities on the Mussalmans once again.

He went to Aligarh and incited the boys to leave the College and asked the Trustees



of the College to refuse the Government grant, "disaffiliate the great institution and reject the charter of the Muslim University." While he was speaking in these terms to the Muslim University, the Benares Hindu University was preparing to accord a royal reception to the Prince of Wales. He let that University continue its "slavish" course of action !

And then came the *hijrat*. Everything destructive of Mussalmans had the Mahatmaic blessings of Gandhi. The movement started in Sind and spread to North-West Frontier Province. At one time as many as 18,000—let me put the figures in words—actually eighteen thousand people were on their way to Afghanistan. They had left their homes, sold out their property for whatever could be fetched to their Hindu brethren and were on their way to Afghanistan to defend the Khilafat.

So everything was going according to plan. Indeed, everything was going so well according to Gandhi's plan, that one can imagine him remarking to himself with satisfaction :

Mischief, thou art afoot,

Take thou what course thou wilt !

But Gandhi could not continue in this strain indefinitely. The mischief was done, his



purpose achieved. The Mussalmans had lost their bearings. They were completely uprooted from their moorings. And now they were wandering, aimless, thoughtless and without any energy to continue the impossible. Gandhi's programme clearly called for a change in tactics.

And so we mark the matchless Gandhi effect his glorious retreat. He began with this: "In their impatient anger, the Mussalmans ask for more energetic and more prompt action by the Congress and Khilafat organisations. To the Mussalmans, Swaraj means, as it must mean, India's ability to deal effectively with the Khilafat question. The Mussalmans, therefore, decline to wait if the attainment of Swaraj means indefinite delay or a programme that may require the Mussalmans of India to become impotent witnesses of the extinction of Turkey in European waters.

"It is impossible not to sympathise with this attitude. I would gladly recommend immediate action if I could think of any effective course. I would gladly ask for postponement of Swaraj activity if thereby we could advance the interest of the Khilafat. I would gladly take up measures outside non-co-operation, if I could think of any, in order to assuage the pain caused to the millions of the Mussalmans."

The Muslim "impatience" was a handy peg to hang his "retreat" on. But the *retreat* was not the end of Gandhi's plan. The *retreat* was merely to mark the ripeness of time for another move—to Gandhi, the real move. What was that move? That move was to build up HINDU NATIONALISM on the ruins of the Mussalmans' separate political existence. Having destroyed the self-determination of the Mussalmans, Gandhi now began his real game in a subtle manner. (It is impossible not to pay tribute to the masterly craftsmanship of Gandhi. But didn't the Mussalmans pay for it with their life?)

Gandhi's purpose was to insinuate a different objective in the minds of the Mussalmans. Having failed in his quixotic method of saving the Khilafat, the Muslim mind was absolutely vacant. And Gandhi proposed to put something in that empty mind. And so we hear Gandhi express his 'humble' opinion.

"In my humble opinion, *attainment of Swaraj is the quickest method of righting the Khilafat wrong*. Hence it is that for me the solution of the Khilafat question is the attainment of Swaraj and *vice versa*. The only way to help the afflicted Turks is for India to generate sufficient power to be able to assert herself. If she cannot develop that power in that time, there is no way out for India and



she must resign herself to the inevitable. What can a paralytic do to stretch forth a helping hand to a neighbour but to try to cure himself of his paralysis? Mere ignorant, thoughtless and angry outbursts of violence may give vent to pent up rage but can bring no relief to Turkey."

So we see, a 'paralytic' cannot do anything. The only way to help Turkey is to be cured of the 'paralysis.' The logic is irrefutable. The only flaw one may detect is in the time factor. Did not the Mahatma know a year or so ago when he launched upon his grand scheme to "right the Khilafat wrong" that India was "paralytic"? If India's "paralysis" was in the way of helping Turkey, it was as much so in the beginning of the campaign as towards its end. But this objection holds good only if we presume the preservation of Khilafat to be the overpowering end in view. This end rules out the movement that was undertaken. But the movement was perfectly justified from another end—the end Gandhi had in mind—namely, the destruction of Muslim solidarity and their separate political entity as represented by an independent organisation and their demoralisation by the inevitable failure of the movement. This end was completely and consummately achieved. The achievement of this end is



MY LEADER

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manifested in the disunity, disbelief and confusion that became the characteristics of the Mussalmans in the post-Khilafat days. The Muslim organisation lost its command, the masses lost their objective. And that was Gandhi's most glorious trophy.



CSL

IV

"No power can enslave the mind and soul of man."
—Jinnah

I have said enough to prove my contention that Gandhi joined the Khilafat Movement to use it for his own purpose; to repeat, for the destruction of that well-defined and separate policy which the Muslim League had succeeded in building up for the Indian Mussalmans and which had found its consummation in the Lucknow Pact. It was immaterial what the Muslim League decided; to side with the Government or oppose it, to side with the Congress or oppose it, or chalk out an altogether different line of action. What was material and important was the fact that the power to take decision for the Mussalmans resided in a Muslim organisation. After the Khilafat Agitation it no longer remained in the power of the Mussalmans to take decision for themselves. Then they were the followers of others' dictates. The very first effect of Gandhi's joining the Khilafat Movement was its complete subservience to his commands. • Knowing fully that nothing



would come out of the agitation, he spurred the Mussalmans on and on to the point of complete destruction, not destruction physically—it could not have been so disastrous—but the destruction of their will and their aims.

If the British had practised a physical butchery on the Mussalmans in the post-Mutiny days, Gandhi performed the butchery of their souls in the Khilafat agitation.

Comparing the two critical periods, namely, the Mutiny and the Khilafat, the latter did infinitely greater harm to the Mussalmans than the former. Whatever sufferings the Mussalmans went through in the post Mutiny days, their faith was intact. It helped them to face the avalanche of British tyranny with calm. But the Gandhi-guided Khilafat Movement made them impotent in will, faith and determination.

Imagine these people who were out to fight and die for Turkey, Khilafat and Islam—these people who on the supposed conception that leaving their homes was the only way they could serve Islam had left them without question in as over-flowing a number as 18,000—these people who had declared that if Khilafat was abolished, the British would be putting an “undue strain on their loyalty to the king”—well, these very people when they emerged out of the cauldron of



Khilafat had thrown Islam to the winds; now they were preaching the doctrine that religion was a private affair between man and God, it had nothing to do with man's temporal side of life. The flamboyant Pan-Islamists had turned unashamed worshippers of the country-tight nationalism. *The pity of it I ago the pity of it !*

Can a more staggering change in mentality and outlook be imagined? Why should not the Hindus worship Gandhi as the Mahatma? He deserves greater credit and greater reward. He had performed what centuries of contact of Hinduism could not do to Islam. Gandhi succeeded in reconverting Indian Mussalmans to the creed of Hinduism—just the state to which every other movement had been reduced in the all-resolving bosom of Hindudom. To justify their stand, the great Muslim Nationalists went to the extent of interpreting the Quran to suit the biddings of Gandhi. Budha was a god in the cosmopolitan temple of Hinduism, why not a god of Islam have a place in it! No wonder Gandhi's Hinduism embraced all religions.

It is enough to cast a glance at the stalwart Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan of the Frontier to know what Gandhi has done to the Mussalmans. The fierce-looking Patlan no longer swears by *Islam and Ku* —



heretofore his only measure of men and things—but by Gandhi's non-violence. *Assalam-ualaikum* has given place to *dandot*—folding of hands! Gandhi's hocus-pocus of 'universalism' has effaced the sharp contours of Islam. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan is a living example of frustrated faith. And all this change came as a result of joining the Congress. If Congress were only a political organisation, why this change in the conduct of life? Surely political conversion should not have induced a change in the Muslim way of life. But this change was inevitable. For, Congress is the name of Hindu cult and it works for it. Once in it, you cannot escape the acceptance of Hindu cult. Of course, for your own deception, you may give it even the sanction of Quran, as indeed many great lights in the Congress have done. One cannot say, was it more to deceive themselves or others, but the central reason for this change remains to be the loss of faith. Jinnah has correctly diagnosed their disease. "... They do so because they have lost faith in themselves."

What did Sir Sayyed fight against? Mullatism, which was reactionary and the British Government which was oppressive. What did Sir Sayyed fight for? To build up a separate political entity of the Mussalmans and contact of Islam with Western

thoughts, because the political liberation of Mussalmans from Western domination could be achieved only if preceded by a profound regeneration of thought. Both these fundamental points of Muslim regeneration were brought to nought by Gandhi's guidance of the Khilafat. Mullaism¹ raised its ugly head and the independent entity of Mussalmans was rent asunder.

Regeneration of thought in Islam depended on two factors. On the rooting out of Mullaism—the symbol of centuries-long stagnation of thought—from our body-politic and the contact of Islam with modern science and learning. With great efforts Sir Sayyid started this process, but with greater ease Gandhi reversed the process in 1919-21. For, who became the protagonists of Gandhi's nationalism? Strange as it would seem, they were the two apparently mutually exclusive elements. One was the intellectuals' element who turned atheists and agnostics—the very home of Sir Sayyid (Aligarh) had

¹ Iqbal says of Mullaism:—

The Ulama have always been a source of great strength to Islam. But during the course of centuries, especially since the destruction of Baghdad they became extremely conservative and would not allow any freedom of Ijtihad, i.e., the following of independent judgment in matters of law. The Wahabi movement which was a source of inspiration to the 19th century Muslim reformers was really a revolt against this rigidity of the Ulama. Thus the first objective of the 19th century Muslim reformers was a fresh orientation of the faith and freedom to reinterpret law in the light of advancing experience. (*Islam and Ahmadism*).



become the hot-bed of atheistic cult. The other was the Mullaism of Deoband and the like institutions. The former had discarded Islam, the latter stuck to the outmoded thoughts in Islam, unrefreshed by reorientation. Both in spirit were against the progressive Islam. And both these elements were at the beck and call of Gandhi. That is where Gandhi's success in checking the progress of Islam and discrediting it in the very eyes of the Mussalmans lies. The remaining Muslim elements were too dumb, bewildered and powerless to give articulation to their thoughts. Atheist intellectuals dubbed them reactionaries; the Mullas described them as *toadies* and *Franghees*. Discredited Islam represents the true picture of post-Khilafat days.

This is the story of the change from Pan-Islamism to Nationalism, from 1916 to 1923.

Gandhi's policy in capturing the Khilafat Agitation and using it for the purpose of destroying Muslims' separate and distinct entity is further clear from what followed those momentous years as concrete results.

First of all we see in 1923 born a new organisation—the Hindu Mahasabha. The Congress was "national" and therefore had to pretend to be impartial on the so-called communal issues. For Mahasabha it was



essential to concentrate on the protection of Hindu rights. In fact, the Mahasabha was to provide the Congress its contents. Congress is in covert what the Mahasabha is in overt. That is to say, while the Mahasabha professes, the Congress practises. And what is the Mahasabha's profession? In the words of Savarkar, it is "the maintenance, protection and promotion of the Hindu race, Hindu culture and Hindu civilisation and the advancement of the glory of the Hindu *rashtra* and with a view to secure them, the attainment of Purna Swaraj."¹ The Congress *practised* this profession in the shape of *Vidya Mandir* scheme, introduction of *Hindi athwa Hindustani* language, hoisting of tri-colour flags and singing of *Bande Matram*. Nationalism meant the communalism of the majority.

Secondly, Mussalmans were completely disunited, confused and split. As we have seen in the first Khilafat year, Mussalmans had trooped into the Congress. They remained there. The Muslim League was almost non-existent. Some of its annual meetings were not attended even by as many as would constitute the quorum.² Other mushroom organisations were growing. There was complete lack of any coherent political thought or programme.

¹ Hindu Mahasabha Ahmedabad Session, 1937.

² Allahabad, 1931 and Delhi, 1933.



Thirdly, the above description of Muslim politics—or lack of it—contrasted sharply with the powerful organisation of the Congress which was now in a position to challenge the British as a parallel power.

Fourthly, and here I want the reader's attention to be particularly focussed, when the League began to assert itself under Jinnah's guidance as the representative organisation of the Mussalmans, it was flatly denied that status. The League was not a representative organisation at all. A national organisation like the Congress could have no truck with a communal organisation like the Muslim League. That is just the point. The Mussalmans were denied the status of a separate political entity. The same Congress which had entered into a pact with the Muslim League in 1916 refused to have anything to do with it in the post-Khilafat years. Why? It was national. But was not Congress national in 1916? The Congress was 'national' right from the date of its birth in 1885. How was it then any more national in the post-Khilafat years and any the less national in 1916? The reason must be sought in the disruption that Gandhi had wrought in the Muslim body-politic. No one ever questioned as to how many people the Muslim League had on its rolls in 1916.



But now that question became the most important.

Denying the Muslim organisation a representative character was deliberate policy which the Congress began to pursue from the post-Khilafat days. This policy is markedly manifest after the election of 1936 for the provincial assemblies. I take the case of United Provinces to illustrate my point.

Before the election, the Congress was not too sanguine about the success it later on actually achieved and was, therefore careful to strike some sort of bargain with the Muslim League. The leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League had agreed to fight the election on a more or less common platform. It was understood that the Muslim League would, in the event of a joint victory, be allotted two places in the Ministry. But when the results were known, there was a hitch. The League would be admitted to the Ministry only on terms; and after lengthy discussion behind the scenes and in the press, these terms were communicated to the Provincial League leader, Mr. Khaliq-uz-Zaman; by the Congress Parliamentary Sub-Committee. The very first clause of those conditions demanded that *"the Muslim League group in the United Provinces Legislature shall cease to function as a separate group."*



To this published statement was appended the short note: *It was hoped that, if these terms were agreed to and the Muslim group of members joined the Congress Party as full members, that group would cease to exist as a separate group.*

That is how the League, apart from being denied the representative character, was sought to be liquidated. Having succeeded in diverting the bulk of the politically-conscious Mussalmans into the Congress fold, these tactics were in the nature of 'mopping-up operations.'

Another 'mopping-up operation' was the Mass Contact Movement. Triumphantly Jawaharlal declared on the occasion of the Convention of Congress M.L.As. at Delhi in 1937 that there were only two parties in the land—the Congress and the Government. The Mussalmans were entirely neglected; they had been absorbed in the great 'national movement.' And to subdue the turbulent elements yet outside the Congress fold, the weapon of Mass Contact Movement was threatened to be used.

This is the short history of the CHANGE and its concrete consequences for the Mussalmans. Can any one now doubt as to the aim of Gandhi in joining the Khilafat Movement? The manner he conducted the movement speaks aloud for his motive. The



results that accrued from the movement confirm his plans.

Disunity, confusion and complete lack of faith in Islam and in themselves were the prominent characteristics of Mussalmans after the Khilafat agitation.

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw a great renascent movement take its birth in Islam. Abdul Wahab in Arabia raised the banner of revolt against the encrustation of Islamic teaching. 'Back to the purity of Islam' was his cry. This was a mighty protest against the alien paganism which had crept into the Islamic polity. The repercussions of this movement were worldwide. Algeria rang with the clarion call of Sannyusi. Soudan with that of Mehdi. And India with that of Sayyed Ahmad Brelvi. In India, Sayyed Ahmad wanted to remove the thick encrustation of Hinduism which had covered the teachings of the Prophet and hid from view the pure simplicity of Islam. Thus he filled the Indian air with a fresh zeal for return to 'Islam.'

This movement had continued to work. It had not stopped with the fall of Sayyed Ahmad on the plain of Balakot.¹ Sir Sayyed was imbued with the same spirit, but only wanted to reorientate the Islamic thought

¹ Hazara District.



in the light of modern times. And with the establishment of Aligarh College and the Muslim League his work had continued.

But what do we see in the post-Khilafat days? That the 'Back to Islam' cry was drowned in the universalism of Hinduism. While the leaders of Islam all over the world—Sayyed Ahmad's movement as shown was merely an offshoot of that world movement—were consumed with the urge to purify Islam of its alien influences, the post-Khilafat day Mussalmans were willing to liquidate the very existence of Islam.

The move to regenerate Islam had, through the good offices of Gandhi, degenerated into a denial of its existence. The aim of rescuing Islam from the clutches of Hinduism had degenerated into throwing it into the bosom of Hinduism. Indeed, Gandhi's religion embraced all religions. Post-Khilafat Mussalmans are a testimony to the fact.

That is what Gandhi did to the Muslim thought. From regarding Islam as the only and the final system of life, the Muslims had come to see no difference between Hinduism and Islam. Gandhian 'universalism' had taken a complete possession of their minds.

This hocus-pocus of 'universalism' is well exposed by a Christian writer who resents Christianity being compared to Hinduism—



this reaction is provoked by that perversion of thought which makes out Gandhi as a modern Jesus Christ. Says he:

"There are millions of amiable, loose thinking men and women in the West who glibly accept the idea of the 'Universality of Religion' who choose to regard all religions as merely different aspects of the same Great Truth. Romain Rolland, for instance, spent the greater part of his life propagating them. To these people, Hinduism and Christianity are merely rays of light that sparkle from the facets of a single diamond; or they are drops from the same clear water of the Universal Ocean. There is an almost inexhaustible stock of cheap metaphors at the disposal of 'Universal Religionists.'

Contrasting Hinduism with Christianity
he says :

"The symbol of Christianity is the figure of our Lord on the cross—the figure of a perfect Man, who, even if we deny him divinity, has given the world its most beautiful legend and its most exalted code of conduct.

"The symbol of Hinduism—or rather, the most widely revered of its many symbols—is the figure of Ganesh, half man and half elephant.

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"Christ on his cross, giving to the world a last shining phrase—'Forgive them for they know not what they do'—Ganesh in his cave, twisting his trunk, riding in a chariot driven



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by a mouse. Can any but a fanatic seriously contest that these two symbols are worthy of equal honour in the Hall of Universal Religion ? ”¹

Thus to Beverly Nichols—for that is the writer whom I have quoted—the very idea of any similarity between Hinduism and Christianity is revolting, while to the Mussalmans, Hinduism and Islam were made to appear as in perfect accord and harmony. A greater perversion in the mentality of the Mussalmans could not be imagined.

This brings out the fundamental change which Gandhi had brought about in the Mussalmans through his guidance of the Khilafat Agitation. And it is with this background of defeated Mussalmans that we have now to determine the value of yet another CHANGE—nay a revolution—which came to pass in their minds.

¹*Verdict on India.*



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V

"Our watchword should be : Faith, Unity and Discipline."
—Jinnah

By the year 1934, the Hindu occupation of the Muslim mind was almost complete. Triumphant Hindu hordes were busy shepherding the disunited, confused and demoralised bands of the Mussalmans into the fold of Hindudom. THERE WERE ONLY TWO PARTIES IN THE LAND—THE BRITISH AND THE CONGRESS—such was the pitch of exuberance of the Hindu conquerors in 1937 and lo! there arose from historic Lucknow a band of warriors yet asserting the integrity of Islam. THERE WAS A THIRD PARTY ALSO IN INDIA—THE MUSSALMANS—that was the battle cry of this band. Free Islam lived, it would live. Islam could never own defeat at the hands of any—much less Hindudom. Small in number, but firm in resolve, disciplined in thought and clear in their aim, the band was led by the sixty-year young general, Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

Jinnah repeated the performance of Sir



Sayyed. He erected himself like a high, strong wall which would simply not let the Muslim degeneration go any further. In vain the Hindu hordes attacked the wall. It stood strong and high, much too high for their petty designs to overcome it. On this side of the wall, reorganisation work took shape, and soon the Mussalmans, under the green crescent-bearing banner of Islam, fresh in enthusiasm and happy with their new-found faith, were up against all odds.

If I were asked to say what has Jinnah done to the Mussalmans and for the Mussalmans, I would answer the question in just eight words. **HE HAS GIVEN THEM BACK THEIR LOST FAITH.** That is all he has done. It was their loss of faith which drove the Mussalmans into the fold of Hindudom and it is their newly-acquired faith which has yet brought them back from the brink of ruination. "I want the Mussalmans to believe in themselves (Jinnah cried) and take their destiny in their own hands. We want men of faith and resolution who have the courage and determination and who would fight single-handed for their convictions though at the moment the whole world may be against them . . ."

Mark the word *faith*. History has no instance to quote of a people ever becoming triumphant on the score of numbers. It is



always faith—the idea of something to live for and die for—that sustains a people in the darkest hour of their struggle and ultimately leads to victory.

In our own times. The Nazi hordes were repelled from the shores of Britain not by any great soldierly skill, or superiority of mechanical equipment—it was simply nowhere. The British invincibility was just due to the birth of a faith in themselves and in their way of life. It was their overpowering realisation that under Nazis they would not be able to live their life as they conceived it, *plus* their reborn faith in their ideology, that made the people of Britain win the Battle of Britain.

What was this retreat from Stalingrad? Do you ascribe it to the Russian superiority of arms? Well, you may think so. But not the Russians. To them it was a great test of their faith. It was again the faith of Russians, in what they were fighting for and dying for, that drove the two hundred Nazi divisions from the very streets of Stalingrad. And to-day Stalingrad breathes free air, not owing to any mechanical superiority in arms, nor even the blunder of the Nazi generals, but owing to the sheer faith of Russians in themselves. The strength which their faith gave them made them unconquerable.



And the same faith which had once made the Mussalmans arise from the obscurity of Arabia and triumph over half the civilized world was set to work again. Jinnah's part in India completely fits in the grand movement of regeneration which is sweeping over the world of Islam. Jinnah has unleashed that pent-up energy to reorientate thought in Islam which had become moribund due to the deadly anti-Islamic influence of Gandhi in the Khilafat days. Only its direction is more sure than it was in the days of Sayyed Ahmad and Sir Sayyed.

Under Jinnah's leadership to-day the Mussalmans desire to pattern their life on the principles of Islam in complete independence of Hinduism. "Achieve Pakistan or perish"—that is Jinnah's war cry. So that it is not merely the freedom of the land that now a Muslim stands for; he stands for the freedom of the operation of the ideology and system of Islam. To him now the freedom of the land is meaningful only if it ensures freedom for the operation of the ideology of Islam. The freedom of the land is useful or otherwise to a Mussalman in strict proportion to what it guarantees in the way of his living the life of a Mussalman. Otherwise, to him, the domination of the Hindus is as abominable a thing as the domination of the British, in some respects



even more so.

By virtue of his putting this clear-cut objective before the hundred million Indian Mussalmans and inexorably working towards its fulfilment, Jinnah has become the greatest living architect of modern Islam. That only makes out how great was Gandhi the enemy of Islam to whom Jinnah embodies his very complete frustration.

That is why I said Gandhi was the true barometer of Jinnah's success. He is.

Jinnah's greatness lies in his peerless character. His character has given the Mussalmans a destiny. But for him, the Mussalmans should have remained charterless on the sea of India's most crucial years. But for him, the ship of Muslim India would have wrecked against the fierce waves of Gandhism. Indeed, he appeared none too soon to captain the ship to safety.

Jinnah has the idealist and the practical politician combined in him—a rare combination. He stands for the reorientation of Islam and regeneration of the Mussalmans—that is his ideal. And by his sheer tenacity of purpose and his steel like hold on the realities around him, he has been able to forge a definite way towards his ideal. It is hardly a matter of a decade and he has completely galvanised the scattered forces of Indian



Islam into a well-knit and indivisible whole. Clear in his aim and confident of his power, to-day Jinnah stands on the threshold of a great revolution. He is indeed a rare phenomenon. In vain I look for someone to compare with him. Perhaps the only man who can be compared with him is LENIN. Both have the gift of idealism and a great practical mind. One brought about a revolution, the other is going to. The two revolutions may however be different in nature, profundity and everlastingness.

Were there a man like Jinnah before the Muslim Spain went down to the Christian Powers in Europe, may be, there were still a Muslim Spain on the map of Europe.

Jinnah is the only consummate politician that the Muslims have produced since the time of their fall—and that date I reckon from the day when Tippu fell on the plain of Seringapatam in 1799—who can hold his own against all the towering personalities of the modern times. It may be a misfortune for a people to produce so few a leader but that is a fact in the modern history of the Mussalmans. Jinnah has the supreme gift of clearly knowing his aim; he is aware of his surroundings, he has a deep knowledge of the problems that confront him; and he has the imagination to plan his move, to choose the right course of action and when chosen




to bring into play that steel-like and dynamic determination which knows no defeat, no retreat and no compromise. He simply must get ahead. It is the working of these qualities, rarely endowed to a single individual, that have given the hundred million Mussalmans their present singleness of outlook. The national and political consciousness of the Hindus is the result of a century long effort of a galaxy of great Hindu leaders. But the Muslims' consciousness of their national and political individuality is the work of ONE MAN, and that too, within the short space of seven years. Not half-centuries, not even decades, but just seven short years.

Again, it is not only on the score of duration that the work of Jinnah is to be adjudged. There is the inevitable factor of the background. For two hundred years the Hindus were on the onward march, educationally, economically and in point of national consciousness. On the contrary this long period is a big gap of retrogression for the Muslims. The little consciousness that they had developed in the short period of ten years—from 1906, when the League was formed, to the Lucknow Pact in 1916—had been uprooted by the Gandhian storm. So that when Jinnah picked them up in 1934-35, the Mussalmans were truly NO

MAN'S LAND. It is in this NO MAN'S LAND that the indefatigable Jinnah ploughed his lonely furrow. To-day that NO MAN'S LAND is fruitful and bears the unmistakable name of PAKISTAN. Thus Pakistan not merely embodies certain tracts of land, or the ideology of the Mussalmans, or even the renaissance of Islam, but it also embodies the seven years' ceaseless work of Jinnah. No leader of modern times was faced with odds so forbidding as Jinnah had to face.

What is the secret of his greatness ?

Firstly, his personality. While the enemies dubb him arrogant, even some of his uncritical followers regard him stern. If the enemies call him arrogant, their purpose is to discredit him in the public eye, but his friends do so merely because they have no minds of their own. For, as a man, Jinnah has few equals. His warmth of feeling and affection of heart are unmistakable. Indeed he is the very soul of high breeding and politeness. But Jinnah possesses the rare quality of knowing his mind and being true to what he has in mind. He is not one of those common people who blow hot and cold at the same time. He is not one of those lukewarm fellows who would agree and disagree at the same moment; who would seek to please everybody lest they hurt any. Not



Quaid-e-Azam addressing the open session in the Islamia College, Lahore
at the Special Pakistan Conference.



knowing what they want and what they profess, this species would, in pretension to gentlemanliness, compromise with any one on anything. Undoubtedly, these people are popular. All the same they are soulless people. Jinnah is the exact opposite of this type of goody-goody gentlemen. He is refreshingly unique in knowing what he wants and meaning what he says. Since he knows his mind, he can always, at a certain point, call halt to agreements and compromises. He knows how far he agrees and where he disagrees. And he has the courage to declare it. Indeed, if Gandhi is inimitable in hiding things, Jinnah is incomparable in speaking his mind in clear terms. No one can be deceived by Jinnah. He is transparently sincere in his thoughts, aims and their expression. No wonder, he is the despair of all hypocrites and sycophants.

Jinnah is the sworn enemy of adventurer leaders whose sole aim is to exploit the ignorant, sentimental people. The Mussalmans have had them in quite a number in the chaotic days after the Khilafat. Any slogan which could draw some people around would be used to gain cheap applause. These adventurers had no objective, no programme. They began and ended with some notoriety. But it did incalculable harm to the people. In their confusion of



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thought, the Mussalmans would follow him in the hope he would be their saviour, ill disastrous results would turn them into confirmed pessimists and indifferent on-lookers of the drama of Indian politics. Thus the confusion created by Gandhi was infinitely more confounded by these adventurer leaders. Jinnah provided a sharp contrast to this type. "Think hundred times before you take any decision, but once a decision is taken, stand by it as one man." This was entirely a new call. The adventurers would never risk the people think, for if they did, who would follow. Their only chance of having their way and grinding their axe was to hypnotise the people into the blind alleys of emotional thoughtlessness. Jinnah was a totally different man. Honest to the last fibre of his being, he would not utter anything he did not mean and would not accept anything which he did not agree to. Gandhi was the last man to expect such a phenomenon in Muslim politics. Adventurers were just the type Gandhi liked. Through them—purchasable commodities as they were—he could easily hoodwink the Mussalmans.

Jinnah is the very quintessence of qualities Islam expects every Mussalman to cultivate. He would suffer no nonsense, he would employ no underhand means to deceive any-

one. ¹ اشد على الكفار ورحماء بينهم is his true description. He recognises an enemy when he meets one and addresses him as such. He does not invent new meanings of ordinary common words to mislead his readers and listeners. He clearly says: "Politics is power; without power there can be no agreement, there can be no peace." He is not a war-monger, but he does not believe in the hocus-pocus of pacifism and non-violence. For instance, it would be impossible for him to pretend to cry over the bombing of the Westminster Abbey and launch upon the "open rebellion" soon after. He does nothing of the kind. If he means to fight he will say so. Referring to a speaker who professed pacifism while speaking on the Criminal Law Amendment Bill in the Central Legislature, he openly declared: "One member said that he stands for pacifism. We have got in every country cranks and crooks who stand for pacifism. I want nothing but entire pacifism all over the world. There should be no war. There should be peace and plenty all over the world. I have no objection of any kind if all wars are banned. I am not now concerned with those Honourable Members who believe in pacifism. For myself, it is not a question of belief in pacifism or not believing in pacifism.

¹ Uncompromising to the opponents and full of the milk of human kindness for his own folk : Holy Quran.



I believe in saving my neck if I am in danger. I do not want to hurt anybody. I want to be a very good man, but it does not follow that everybody in this world is good and does not want to hurt me. Therefore, I say that it is really not a question of pacifism or non-pacifism. As practical men are we going to defend ourselves or not? That is the question. I say I am going to defend myself." On the same issue the great Mahatma would have said, he would not even kill a fly. He would be non-violent. He would not co-operate with the Japanese. He would give them no shelter. He would even refuse them water and so on. But actually he would follow this *pacifist* declaration with the campaign of cutting wires, removing rails, burning houses, police stations, and causing untold havoc.

Why do I bring in Gandhi? Because contrasts help much in making meanings clear. Jinnah and Gandhi represent two opposite ideologies, two opposite frames of mind, two opposite lines of conduct, and two very opposite directions.

While Gandhi represents the spirit of Hinduism, Jinnah represents the spirit of Islam. And never the twain shall meet.

Jinnah has been hammering this point from the time he took charge of the nascent movement in the Indian Islam. By his



thoughts, by his actions and the people he leads he has been at pains to make it clear to the Western world that it should not commit the blunder of regarding the two as one. Indeed no other man could have represented the contrast of Islam against the Hinduism of Gandhi as did Jinnah.

Another illustration in contrast. Gandhi would address any person in the opposite camp or his own, as *shriyut, janab, dear friend*—once he was much exercised over the appellation he used for Jinnah. By this ingratiating gesture he makes himself out to be a magnanimous person whose spirit of humility and accommodation knows no bound. Jinnah never strains for effect. His only care is to be straightforward and understood. Mincing words is not his *forte*. When Abul Kalam Azad wanted to approach him as representing the Congress, Jinnah had not the least hesitation in telling him: "YOU ARE A SHOW BOY OF THE CONGRESS, GIVE IT UP." He cannot suffer humbug, much less what he regards treachery to the Mussalmans. That is the difference. While one can't make out the meanings of Gandhi's statements, Jinnah's mind is open to the full view of the public.

This is Jinnah—clear and definite, true and trustworthy, both to his followers and to his opponents. He is something more. He is

calm and courageous, quiet and dignified. He would never lose his poise and balance of mind in the face of the greatest provocation. When he took up the cudgels on behalf of his people and asserted the presence of the third party—THE MUSSALMANS—and not only made this assertion but actually brought the scattered Mussalmans into the fold of one organisation, with a definite and well-defined policy which spelt the ruin of the ALL-INDIA REPRESENTATIVE character of the Hindu Congress, the High Command thought of a plan to discredit and unnerve Jinnah. They let loose the Hindu nationalist press to vilify and abuse Jinnah. And so started an era of black journalism in Hindu India. The printing presses—in their hundreds and thousands—were day and night busy turning out columnfuls and editionfuls, volumes and series of abuses on the head of Jinnah. No description was too mean for these Congress sheets which they would not collectively and severally invent for the accredited leader of the Mussalmans. But did it at all affect the great man? He remained calm and unruffled. His only care was to go ahead. The all-India abuses, from the Mahatmaic tone to the commonplace gibberish, could not daunt the dauntless.

It is altogether impossible to say too much about Jinnah. To the Mussalmans he is the



very symbol of their renaissance. But not even their adoration and their not easily-gainable love and their processions of thousands and lakhs have had the least effect on the definiteness of his plan and the clarity of his mind. He remains as much unmoved by praise as he is unaffected by calumny.

He is the despair of Hindus, he is the hope of the Mussalmans.

There is another secret of his greatness. It is the people he leads. The hundred million Mussalmans are a strange people. They are warlike, turbulent and extremely republican in spirit. They own no equal. That is why the leadership of the Mussalmans has always been unstable. Writing about Jinnah's leadership on his 64th birthday in a weekly journal, an observer made the penetrating remark: "Let it be said to his credit that he has remained the leader of the Mussalmans for *three consecutive years*." Indeed it was a great miracle. This statement gives a clear insight into the character of the Mussalmans and illustrates my point that it is a very difficult job to lead them. Their independence of character makes them thoroughly uncontrollable. It is just like riding a raw horse. But Jinnah has actually tamed them under his leadership, so that now they owe him allegiance as no one ever commanded it before.



What makes the Mussalmans unique? Now-a-days the character of a people is appraised in terms of geography and climate. Their peculiarity of traits are sketched in the light of the coldness or hotness of weather. These things are not quite irrelevant in estimating a people. But they are not the chief things. The chief factor which determines and influences the character of a people is their ideology which gives them their outlook, their conduct, their law and their culture, their morality and their *raison d'être* in crises. In this light the Mussalmans are a unique people. Islam gives them a cohesion of association. Their cardinal principles are belief in one Absolute God and His Messenger, Muhammad, and the Holy Book—Quran. This common belief is the only factor which unites the Mussalmans amongst themselves and separates them from others. When they say 'God is Great' they only announce their disavowal of any other allegiance. In one-half sentence they raise their status above every mortal who worships any one but God. This concept is pivotal to the Islamic faith and has a great cultural and practical significance, which is bound to be reckoned with by those who hold themselves worthy of allegiance, worship and adoration. A Muslim's face is set against them all.

To the Mussalmans the ultimate end of



everything is spiritual. In the illuminating words of the late Allama Iqbal: "To Islam matter is spirit realising itself in space and time." Ethical values are, therefore, infinitely superior to, and more valuable than, the whole material world. Thus a Mussalman attaches importance to his worldly surroundings only in the light of ethical ends. They are merely a means towards another end. They are to be used, not worshipped. A Mussalman is ever ready to lay down his life for the end he has before him. Moreover, he believes death not to be the end of man, but merely passing from one stage of life to another—a higher stage, promotion to which depends on his having qualified for it. That makes out life to be a continuous and creative process which suffers no end. Further, he believes that Humanity is born of one breath. It is not therefore for him to discriminate between one man and another on the score of geography, colour or creed. The only factor which divides him from others is that of disbelief. That is why Islam does not admit of any distinction of nationality based on geographical peculiarities. Imbued with these beliefs and principles, a Muslim is extremely republican in spirit, fearless and courageous. To him material things are merely a means to an end, the loss of which should not daunt him nor the overflowing of which should make him

arrogant./ This is what a Muslim ought to be and what he ever looks up to be. It is these principles that make Mussalmans an important factor in any society of men.

The world history is full of pages and chapters of the brave acts and selfless sacrifices of the Mussalmans. In fact they are the only people who possess a marvellous power of resilience. From the time of the British advent in India till to-day, theirs has been a long tale of trials and tribulation, yet they remain undefeated. The worst of sufferings have not broken their spirits. Ere-long they would be seen stand up again. Imagine their responding to the call of Jinnah and rehabilitating their position from what they had been reduced to by the Mahatma. Two hundred years of prosperity and education and sixty years of Congress' hard work has not done to the Hindus what seven years' work of one man has done to the Mussalmans. The reason for this difference lies in the different characteristics of the two people born of the different rules of conduct which govern their lives.

It is this type of men—fearless, turbulent and socially solid and democratic—that Jinnah heads in India. It is this character of Muslim people which Gandhi sought to change in vain. Jinnah's main task has been to give them back the character which Islam



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seeks to inculcate in each one of its votaries.

Jinnah's personality *plus* the kind of people he leads makes his leadership immense with potentialities for India, Asia and the world at large.



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VI

"I do not believe for a single moment that any power can declare any other country or a nation independent by a mere declaration. And I say no power can continue the subjugation of people of another country if the people of that country are fit to throw off the yoke."

—Jinnah

Jinnah's main work consists in this : he has restored to the Mussalmans their separate distinct identity, and given them that degree of consciousness of their political individuality as they never possessed before. While under Gandhi, the Mussalmans had lost themselves in Hindudom, masquerading as nationalism, under Jinnah they have learnt, acquired and achieved their right of self-determination. In one word he has completely undone Gandhi's work. The entire importance of Jinnah's achievement lies in this. Pakistan is merely of subsidiary importance. Above all was the question whether the Mussalmans had a right to separate and distinct existence. It is around this question that the whole Indian politics have revolved for the last nine years. Jinnah's success lies in having proved to the hilt that the Mussalmans were a separate nation,



in organising them as such, and earning for them the right of self-determination. Once this question was settled, Pakistan was a logical sequence.

Being the two outstanding phenomena in the Indian politics poised against each other, Gandhi and Jinnah's aims and programmes are bound to be closely inter-related. The success of the one is the failure of the other. Thus the work of Jinnah's undoing Gandhian plans and schemes is the story of Jinnah's phenomenal rise on the firmament of Indian politics. Having stated that Jinnah has pre-eminently succeeded in giving the Mussalmans a separate and distinct entity, I have said all. And now it remains to be seen how did he achieve that objective.

Here I must own to a feeling of nervousness in setting to myself the task of outlining the work and achievements of Jinnah. The canvas of this little book is much too small-sized for painting the vast proportions of his work. And I am none too expert a painter. But the urgency of the work bids me to go on.

I cannot do better than begin this narrative with an incident at a meeting I happened to attend one evening in the winter of—I am not sure of the year but it was one of the earliest years of Jinnah's reorganisational work of the League. The meeting was held in the Anglo-Arabic



College, Delhi. Mr. Jinnah was the main speaker. I had never heard him before. Only I knew him as a prominent politician and a member of the Central Assembly—the sittings of which I had not yet attended but longed to attend for the love of hearing good speeches. (School and college debating societies inculcate in students the love of listening to speeches as connoisseurs of art.) The meeting that evening was arranged by my energetic cousin—now a major in the Army somewhere on the Burma front—who was the secretary of the College Union. Since it was my passion to hear speeches, I had a number of my favourite speakers. There was on my list of favourites the name of Sarojini Naidu, Ataulloh Shah Bukhari and many others. I was looking forward to adding Jinnah's name to my list. As it turned out to be the case that evening, he did not enter my list; he entered my heart. That is how it happened. Jinnah entered the Hall and there were no shouts of *Allah-u-Akbar* or any of those usual slogans now invariably associated with his appearance. Not many people noticed him entering the Hall. There were many others who spoke on the occasion. If I remember aright, the subject for discussion was the 'Present Muslim Politics.' Immediately before Jinnah, an old Khilafatist spoke. A talented speaker, he had the full command of the audience. His



plaintive recitation of Ghalib's poetry had given many of us tearful eyes. And then raising his voice to the highest pitch he challenged the audience. "Will you fight for Islam?" (Chorus of yes, yes). "Will you give your lives for Islam?" (Chorus of yes, yes). "Will you give subscription for the cause of Islam?" (Chorus of yes, yes). And then the speaker sat back in his chair, without enlightening the public as to what was the particular cause of Islam at the moment that demanded life and subscription. Then the president announced the name of Jinnah. Jinnah came to the lectern without causing any visible commotion in the audience. "Mr. President," he began almost inaudibly, "I am sorry to strike a discordant note. But I must express my opinion. I think it is criminal to ask the people to fight for Islam and give their lives for Islam without first being clear about our aims and methods. I consider it criminal to order the people to fight without first giving them proper training to fight and full equipment for the fight. There is a duty which people have to perform, but before asking the people to do their duty, there is a duty which the leader must perform. Any general who orders his men to fight without first giving them training and equipment is merely throwing them in the mouth of hell. He is a criminal. Mr. President, we have



Journalist's speech
long conducted our politics on these suicidal lines. It is time we change..." That is all I remember of that speech. But that evening I recognised in Jinnah a man with a difference. He made me forget the art of oratory; instead he focussed my attention on the reality of things, on the meaning of inner relationship between thoughts and actions. Since then the art of elocution has lost its charm for me as an art.

However, this was only the first indication of Jinnah's mind to me. It was refreshingly different. What Jinnah aimed at was clarity of thought and definiteness of programme and the preparation for its achievement. No step to be taken without full and prior preparation for that step. "To make a good soldier at least a year is required. To make a good subaltern at least five years are required." This is foremost in his thoughts before ordering his people to fight. This element of calculation was a new thing in Muslim politics. So far it had remained foreign to the thoughts of Muslim leadership. With Jinnah there was no working up of emotions; it was cold action for clear aims.

What was the immediate task before him? The immediate task before him was to arouse the Mussalmans to the consciousness that the drift of their politics was ruinous. It would lead to their complete extinction.



The need of the hour was the reorganisation of the Mussalmans as a separate entity in the Indian body-politic. How did Jinnah conceive this separate organisation of the Mussalmans in complete independence of the Congress? He was himself a good Congressman not long ago. His reasons for the change are characteristic of him. If the late Allama Iqbal's conclusion that the only way the Mussalmans could live as Mussalmans was in separation was due to his clairvoyant perception, to Jinnah it was a matter of test and trial, experience and examination. Referring to the identity of views between him and Iqbal, Jinnah said: "His views were substantially in consonance with my own and had finally led me to the same conclusions as a result of *careful examination and study of the constitutional problem facing India* and found expression in due course in the united will of Muslim India as adumbrated in the Lahore Resolution..."¹

Explaining the causes of this change of position, he said: "Many efforts have been made since 1924 till the Round Table Conference to settle the Muslim-Hindu question. At that time there was no pride in me and I used to beg from the Congress. I worked so incessantly to bring about a rapprochement that a newspaper remarked

¹ Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah.

that Mr. Jinnah is never tired of Hindu-Muslim unity. But I received the shock of my life at the meetings of the Round Table Conference. *In the face of danger the Hindu sentiment, the Hindu mind, the Hindu attitude led me to the conclusion that there was no hope of unity . . .*"²

There could be no Hindu-Muslim understanding in the post-1924 years, because the INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS could not degrade itself to treating the Mussalmans as an equal, worthy of equal rights. Nineteen twenty-four was not 1916. Gandhi had brought about a tremendous change in the status of the Muslim League. Once worthy of being addressed as the representative of the Mussalmans, the Muslim League no longer enjoyed that status in the post-Khilafat years. Having realised the change, Jinnah set himself to organising the Mussalmans under a separate organisation and make the defunct Muslim League once again the authoritative representative of the Mussalmans. For he clearly realised : "Honourable settlement can only be achieved between equals, and unless the two parties learn to respect and fear each other, there is no solid ground for any settlement. Offers of peace by the weaker party always mean confession of weakness, and an invitation to aggression

² *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah.*



...all safeguards and settlement would be a scrap of paper unless they are backed by power. Politics mean power and not relying only on cries of justice and fairplay or goodwill ..."¹

It was this grim recognition of facts—the facts which the Mussalman leaders had, so far, ignored out of sheer imbecility—which made Jinnah raise a clarion call to the hundred million Mussalmans. "I want the Mussalmans to ponder over the situation and decide their own fate by having one single definite uniform policy which should be loyally followed throughout India." Turning to the Congress Mussalmans he said. "It was a great mistake when they preached unconditional surrender. It is the height of defeatist mentality to throw ourselves on the mercy and good-will of others, and the highest act of perfidy to the Mussalman community; and if that policy is adopted, let me tell you, the community will seal its doom ..." What was the remedy? "Only one thing can save the Mussalmans and energise them to regain their lost ground. *They must first recapture their own souls and stand by their lofty position and principles which form the basis of their great unity and which bind them in one body-politic.*"

That Jinnah should have succeeded in

¹Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah.



winning 60 to 70 per cent. seats contested by the Muslim League in 1936 elections for provincial assemblies in his very first round of reorganisation work was due to his correct diagnosis of the situation, his intense sincerity of purpose, his insistent call to action, and his acute consciousness of Muslim degradation. "The Mussalmans are going down and down for the last two hundred years. They are nowhere, economically, educationally and politically. This tide of degeneration has got to be arrested," so he once revealed his mind to me. He spoke with such grief that I have not the heart to tell in full how acutely he felt about the situation. I could hardly dare a glimpse into his heart. His feelings for the Mussalmans' downfall were too deep for my plumbing. The moment he begins to describe the Muslim situation, it is not for the heart to bear it. Even a stone would melt in the furnace of his feelings. It is with this burning consciousness of Muslim degeneration which was fast consuming him that Jinnah started on his work. And it is with this indescribable pain that he called out: "This is the moment of life and death for the Mussalmans. Take it from me that unless there is unity among the Muslims at any cost they will be lost." Iqbal did not say in vain that an appeal which springs from heart commands acceptance. Who can doubt that Jinnah's call was



from the bottom of his heart, in that, everybody listens to his call now.

But his efforts to reorganise the Mussalmans should have been fruitless, had he not attended beforehand to an important question. In fact, his attending to that question at that early time shows that he had a plan of his own for the Mussalmans right from the day he took up the work of Muslim reorganisation. The question he attended to was the question of Federation. And that I count as his most brilliant and fundamental success. Again it was as great a failure of Hindu Congress as it was the success of the Mussalmans. For, if the Congress had accepted the Federal part of the Government of India Act, 1935, the progress of Muslim renaissance would have received a serious setback. Therefore, it goes to the credit of Jinnah that he attended to this question at its proper time. He opposed Federation. The reasons he gave in the debate on this issue in the Central Legislature in the year 1935 are interesting to recapitulate. He said: "I have seen your scheme and it is thoroughly rotten, fundamentally bad and totally unacceptable . . . now I will tell you why I object to the Central scheme. I object to the Central scheme because it is devoid of all basic and essential elements and the fundamental



requirements which are necessary to form any Federation. My second ground is that it proposes the entry of the princes on terms and conditions laid down by them, as *sine qua non* and as conditions precedent, and which are, on the face of them, most detrimental to the vital interests of British India . . . to All-India Federation and the Honourable the Home Member very rightly said that even Mahatma Gandhi was not opposed to All-India Federation. What follows from that? When I say that I am not opposed to All-India Federation, does it follow from that that you are to hold me in any scheme of All-India Federation that you laid down, however bad and however unacceptable it may be? Is that the argument? . . . I say, standing on the floor of the House, that I do not preclude myself from considering any alternative scheme of All-India Federation which, I think, is in the interests of British India . . . I say it is no use going on like this. We have gone on four years. On the one hand, the princes have laid down their definite ultimatum—this and no more. On the other hand the British Government have laid down their safeguards—an iron wall. This you must accept and call it a Federation. That is not a fair way of looking at the scheme. Therefore I am obliged to say this scheme is not acceptable . . . It is much worse than the present Con-



stitution . . . I believe that it means nothing but absolute sacrifice of all that British India has stood for and developed during the last 50 years, in the matter of progress in the representative form of Government . . . My next objection is that it is not workable. It does not really satisfy anybody and it certainly does not satisfy the minimum demand of anybody. It is not workable. Believe me it will lead us to nothing but bitterness and ill-will, nothing but wrangles in the so-called Federal Legislature . . . I appeal to the Princes also—is this the responsibility which they laid down for the Centre and on which condition they are prepared to come into the Federation? The Princes laid it down that, 'yes, we are willing to come, provided there is a real, substantial responsibility at the Centre.' Do they find that that is there? Here there are 98 per cent. of the safeguards and two per cent of responsibility. Sir, I appeal to them to consider this aspect . . . what do we find about the safeguards? I am not going into the various clauses of the Statute. I will only give a short summary to the House in two sentences. Reserve Bank Currency Exchange—nothing doing. Railway Board—nothing doing, mortgaged to the hilt. What is left? Fiscal Autonomy Convention. Next what is left? Defence, External Affairs—reserved. Finance—it is already mortgaged to the hilt. Our Budget, and the little that



may be there, what do we find? Special responsibility of the Governor-General! His powers as to the Budget and the estimates, his powers as to the interference in legislation, his extraordinary powers, his special responsibility, sir, what do they leave us? What will this Legislature do? The Honourable the Home Member said: 'Are we willing to go on with this present humiliating and intolerable Constitution?' I say, I do not like this Constitution, it is humiliating, it is intolerable, but I will refer you to the words of Lord Reading. It has got more power than the one that you are giving me, and the one that you are proposing now is more humiliating and more intolerable than the present one . . ."¹

I have deliberately given long extracts of Jinnah's speech on the issue of Federation. I have done so because, to repeat, I consider it one of his greatest achievements. But for it, there could have been no demand of Pakistan. What we mark here is that Jinnah is at pains to argue for the rejection of the Federation part of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the acceptance of the part relating to the Provincial Autonomy, because he considers it an "advancement" and so pleads for "working it for what it is worth." Sir N. N. Sarkar (the then Law Member)

¹ *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah.*



considered Jinnah's amendment to the Congress motion of total rejection of the Bill as "crooked, disingenuous and tortuous." That is to say Sarkar had got some inkling of Jinnah's mind. Here we find Jinnah pleading for the rejection of the Federation on the ground of 98 per cent. safeguards and utter lack of power and in so doing he invokes and gets the co-operation and support of the Congress, the Princes and other elements. But, was insufficiency of power at the Centre the real motive of Jinnah's rejection of the Federation? A careful reading of Jinnah's mind will tell you that his real reason in rejecting the Federation was the well-founded fear that the Federation would make Hindu majority an irresistible and irremovable power at the Centre. Once saddled in the Centre they will be in a commanding position to muzzle the four or five Muslim provinces into complete subordination. That, Jinnah feared, would result in an abject vassalisation of Muslim-majority provinces. Thus the rejection of the Federation part of the Government of India Act was the first essential step which could be taken towards establishing the Muslim right of self-determination in India. Politics did not permit Jinnah to state his reasons then. But he came out with them three years later.¹

¹ Muslim League Patna Session in 1938.



"Let the Congress continue to say that they will never accept Federation. But I tell you I do not at all believe in the professions of the Congress. The Congress will tumble into it just as it tumbled into the Provincial part of the Constitution... The whole game of the Congress is and has been to get a substantial majority in this wretched, highly objectionable and rotten constitution which they want to enjoy. If they get a majority, they will accept the Federation with utmost glee, and then they will be in to pursue their nefarious scheme of destroying the Muslim culture and organisation as the one and the only totalitarian organisation and to build up the Congress organisation of the Fascist brand. And they will be able to establish their ideal of Hindu Raj in Hindustan..."

And again: "The Congress game with regard to Federation is very clear. If the Congress can gain control over the Federal machinery, then by means of direct and indirect powers vested in the Federal Government, the Congress would be able to reduce to nonentity the Governments of the Hon'ble Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq in Bengal and the Hon'ble Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan in the Punjab. Soon in the end the Congress will have seven provinces where they enjoy overwhelming numerical majority as a gift of



God, and the other four provinces where Muslims dominate will be the feudatories of the Congress High Command.”¹

That Jinnah was correct in his reading of the Congress mind was borne out by the storm that raged before the second election of Subhash Bose to the presidency of the Congress about the acceptance of Federation. Bose accused Patel of having even prepared the list of Ministers to be nominated for the Centre. The tussle ultimately resulted in the ignominious overthrow of Bose from the Congress *gaddi*.

Thus we understand what was Jinnah's foremost reason to oppose the Federation. The Congress opposed the Federation for show, just as it opposed the Autonomy for show. Getting some sort of assurance of

¹ In his Presidential Address at the Madras Session (1941) of the All-India Muslim League, Jinnah said: “After the war had broken out the first good news, along with other bad news that we got, was the declaration of the Viceroy that His Majesty's Government are pleased to suspend the All-India Federation Scheme embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935 (cheers). It was only suspension. We know how capable our British friends are in the science and game of diplomacy. We knew that was not enough, because what was suspended may be again established at any time. Therefore, our first and foremost demand was that it should not only be suspended but must be abandoned. After long-drawn correspondence and interviews, the Government declared that the whole problem of India's future constitution will be considered *de novo*, including the policy and the plan on which the Government of India Act, 1935 was based. That was no doubt a great relief, because it was against that part of the Act that Muslim India was fighting from the very commencement.”



non-interference from the Governors, the Congress formed Ministries with the avowed aim of "wrecking" the Constitution but actually working it so well to the realisation of Hindu Raj as to leave it with great heaviness of heart when forced to do so. Some such assurance could readily have been grasped for getting into authority at the Centre also.

On the contrary, Jinnah's policy was consistent and clear. He opposed the Federation because that would have been the death-knell of the Muslim existence in India, but he pleaded for accepting the Autonomy for "what it was worth" in order to give the Mussalmans a chance to consolidate their position in their majority provinces in immunity from the Hindu Centre. The time has proved beyond doubt the correctness of the lead Jinnah gave long before the Mussalmans were even conscious of the desperate position they were in, much less feel the necessity of a strong separate organisation.

Jinnah's next task was to arouse the Mussalmans to the gravity of the situation and stress on them the necessity of organising themselves. His position was essentially so correct, his sincerity so transparent and his personality so commanding that ere long Jinnah mustered enough strength to take up



his position against the huge well-disciplined Fascist organisation of the Congress. His position was that whatever the agreement there might be between the Hindus and the Mussalmans, it must be on the basis of equality and that implied the organisation of the Mussalmans. He had to put up a great fight against the Congress High Command's "preposterous claim that they are entitled to speak on behalf of the whole of India, that they alone are capable of delivering the goods." Others were asked to accept rights and safeguards from the Congress as gifts from a mighty sovereign. "The Congress High Command," said Jinnah, "declare that they will redress the grievances of the Muslims and they expect the Muslims to accept the declaration. I want to make it plain to all concerned that we Muslims want no gifts. The Muslims want no concessions. We Muslims of India have made up our mind to have our fullest rights but we shall have them as rights, not as gifts or concessions."

Jinnah had to contend against two forces when he started on his work. There were of course the Hindus; but there were also the Mussalmans. The Hindus were naturally opposed to any movement of organisation among the Mussalmans because that endangered their paramountcy in Indian politics. The Muslim opposition was different in

nature. As we have seen, they were disunited and the politically conscious amongst them were divided into two camps. One group was facing the British and trying to bask under the sunshine of bureaucratic patronage. The other group was facing the Congress. They were facing the Congress because "they had lost faith in themselves." Both were careerists. To one suited the British patronage and to other the Mahatma's "blessings." Jinnah had to fight both these elements. It did not take him long to wean away those who faced the British Government from their position. Jinnah told them that they could never get anything from the British by playing the sycophants. The remedy was organisation. But he had to face tremendous odds so far as the Mussalmans in the Congress camp and under Gandhi's influence were concerned. These Mussalmans had the halo of Khilafat agitation around them; and even now in their misguided thoughts they were fighting for Swaraj to "right the Khilafat wrong." They were using the Gandhi prescription to cure themselves of their "paralysis." And in that process they had cultivated the deadly disease of disruption which was eating into the vitals of Muslim solidarity. As for the great Muslim lights in the Congress, they had built up their vested interests and there was no coming back for them. The masses, on the



other hand, were generally under the influence of the ignorant and bigotted Mullaism. Both of them, on the biddings of the Congress High Command, or to be precise, Gandhi's, dubbed Jinnah reactionary and pro-Government. Imagine Jinnah who had been a life-long opponent of the Government being dubbed pro-Government! But that was the only weapon they could use. Calling anyone whom they want to throttle down for daring he dared to think independently a *communalist*, *toady* and *reactionary* is their pet game and very successful game too. The Congress High Command has evolved the philosophy that everyone should pattern his thoughts on the line of Congress if he wanted to be on the right side of their ubiquitous press. Jinnah put it very well. "The worst *toady* on earth, the most wicked *communalist* to-day amongst Muslims when he surrenders unconditionally to the Congress and abuses his own community becomes the nationalist of nationalists tomorrow."

Mullaism adopted its old method of *kufrbazi*. Armed with a photo of Jinnah, maulvis would go out to villages and use their poisonous argument with all the effectiveness of their full-throated rhetoric: "Is this the face of a Mussalman? Do you see any beard? Can he be the leader of the

Mussalmans ? ” According to them the only qualification for leadership was a beard. All the same these maulvis had immense influence on the ignorant masses. Jinnah knew how these people were being used by the Congress. The Congress was adopting the policy of its masters : Divide and rule. Denying Muslim League the status of the accredited representative of the Mussalmans, Congress was putting up different people to oppose Jinnah and forming different *anjumans* and organisations to endorse the Congress creed. The few Muslims who had remained in the Congress were fast promoted to the hierarchy of the High Command to deceive the world into believing that the Mussalmans were with the Congress ; not only that, they were its leaders. The “degree of their reward ” corresponded to the “ extent of their perfidy ” to the Mussalmans. These people had the vast proportions of the nationalist press at their disposal to splash their great speeches and praise their great doings. On the contrary Jinnah’s was a lone voice. But it was persistent, strong and challenging and ultimately it sounded the deathknell of all the false gods of Gandhi’s creation. Indeed it worked like Moses’ dragon which had swallowed the whole medley lot of snakes created by the magicians. Quite the same thing happened in India. Though faced with heavy odds, Jinnah yet



prevailed over them all. The Mussalmans began to troop in the Muslim League and soon there was only one voice among the Mussalmans and that was Jinnah's.

Congress activities of dividing the Mussalmans were many-sided. First, it would put up its selectees for high offices in the organisation. Abul Kalam Azad has more than once been raised to presidentship. Gandhi is never tired of telling the world that the Congress president is a Muslim divine. So, who can say the Mussalmans are not with the Congress? Second, it would create many nationalist-brand bodies. Existence of such bodies lasted only for the duration an emergency required them to raise their voice against the Muslim League. Third, the loudly heralded Mass Contact Movement was started. In the name of "Nationalism" Muslim masses were sought to be hypnotised into the Congress over the heads of the Muslim leaders because they would not agree to unconditional surrender. Fourth, pure Congress Ministries were formed in Congress provinces and the clause of representation of minorities in the Governor's Instrument of Instruction was utilised to offer a Ministership as a bait to any Mussalman who would abjure his separate party and sign the Congress pledge. (I have already given the U.P. case in illustration of this point.) Fifth,



in the Muslim majority provinces the Congress Party in the Assembly was instructed always to side against the League and encourage independent individual Muslim groups form Ministries so that they depended on the Congress Party support for their existence and thus obliged to carry out the Congress biddings. These tactics have been time and again exposed in Sind. In 1938 Jinnah was able to bring all the Muslim groups together, but the Congress instigation disrupted the united front by assuring support to the late Allah Bakhsh whose Ministry had been threatened before. This rightly provoked Jinnah to remark that the Congress High Command was "obsessed with one and the only idea of destroying any effort which will bring solidarity among the Muslims at the sacrifice of not only the vital interests of the country at large but also Sind where it is essential to have a stable ministry for the welfare and the progress of the people ; and they do not seem to hesitate to sacrifice all their principles, their interests, their professions and the interests of the people which they claim so loudly to serve."¹

Worse than these open opponents, Jinnah had also to deal with disruptors within the League. There are always elements in a national body whose association with it is

¹ *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah.*



more for ends of their own. They are incapable of that impersonal devotion to the cause which would induce them to suppress themselves and their opinions in the interest of the professed cause. The Muslim League had and still has, a similar element within its fold. I would not mention names, but these people began to regard the League as their creation. They thought themselves too big for any cause and principle. Moreover they were jealous of Jinnah's growing hold on the Muslim masses, quite forgetting that Jinnah's influence with the masses was not due to any hypnotism he practised, but essentially to the correctness of the policy he advocated and the whole-hearted devotion with which he advocated it. The common run of Mussalmans could see it and therefore they gave Jinnah their unstinted support. It may be said that the Punjab and Bengal were the chief contributors of this disrupting element to the League, but Jinnah's personality, *plus* the people's will, soon made them ineffective. Personal ends cannot stand before impersonal devotion to principles.

Some misguided Mussalmans also asked: What sacrifice has Jinnah made? Their notion of sacrifice is jail-going. That is a convenient pattern of sacrifice which the *non-violence* of the Mahatma has evolved. 'Go to jail and demand an office.' Indeed



the Congress-stricken politics have made the meaning of the word sacrifice utterly artificial and lifeless. I was surprised when the same charge was brought against Jinnah by a well-placed Hindu journalist friend of mine. What sacrifice has Jinnah made? he threateningly asked. His question was pertinent, in that, Hindus have seen the Muslims make sacrifices in the Mutiny and Khilafat days and that pattern of sacrifice suits Hindu interests very well. The Muslim conception of sacrifice is sharply different from that of Hindus. If Mussalmans rise to defend a cause, they shall lay down their lives for it. Jail-going does not befit their make-up of mind. Eighteen thousand people left for Afghanistan without caring for the huge loss they had to suffer. Shahidganj mosque claimed many Muslim lives. For the Muslims, *sufferings* for a cause have quite different connotation from those entertained by the Hindus. Therefore, when the Mussalmans brought the charge of no sacrifice against Jinnah, however ill-informed they were, they meant it. But when the same charge is brought by the Hindus against Jinnah, their only regret is that Jinnah is keeping the Mussalmans away from their traditional mode of sacrifice which has invariably entailed for them untold misery. Hindus have always built their great mansions of wealth on the ruins of the Mussalmans. And

Jinnah was not giving them that chance. On the contrary his whole effort has been concentrated on weaning away the Mussalmans from the path of violent but fruitless outbursts. These violent outbursts, without any well-considered direction, have been the ruin of the Mussalmans. Not that they have to be evaded. "I am not afraid of revolution. I think it is the right of every country to revolt," declared Jinnah in the Assembly. But his only care is that the revolution should hit the opponent whom he wants to hit and not the hitter. For that, planning, training and creating proper opportunities are primary. Without these it will be disastrous, as the Mussalmans have always found it to their cost. Hence firstly, he wanted to build up a solid and conscious support for his programme. If that was forthcoming, he was ready to give orders to march, and even "face bullets." But before that he wanted to feel sure that there was a reasonable chance of defeating his enemies. Generalship does not consist in jeopardising the lives of men—such a general would be shot as incompetent to hold the position—it consists in achieving an end with the minimum of loss. A general's first care is to be cautious. Generalship is not a chess-game, it is a game which involves the precious lives of the people. "If you kill one man intentionally, you have killed the whole of



humanity." This is the Quran's injunction. Therefore, by all means sacrifice for the cause—no cause can sustain without it—but not without the precision of a plan.

For the first time the modern Indian Islam has produced a general of the level-headedness of Jinnah. His is a balanced mind; he knows when to go forward, when to halt and how to *cover* himself. Each Muslim life is a trust to him from God. Will he squander the trust just for the sake of fun and show? The Hindus' greatest regret is that Jinnah will not do anything of the kind. His only measure of action is the interests of the Mussalmans, the integrity of Islam. That is the only objective to which he owes allegiance and holds himself answerable. "I say the Muslim League is not going to be an ally of anyone, but would be the ally of even the devil if need be in the interest of Mussalmans." Again: "It is not because we are in love with imperialism; but in politics one has to play one's game as on the chess-board. I say the Muslims and the Muslim League have only one ally and that ally is the Muslim nation, and one and only one to whom they look for help is God."¹

No wonder Jinnah is a leader with a difference. His greatest achievement is the hard fact of having taught the Mussalmans that

¹ *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah.*



the only standard and touchstone for their actions is the interests of Islam and the Mussalmans. He has given the Mussalmans a measure in life whereby to judge and determine their actions—a measure which they had long lost in the debacle of Gandhian politics. This is the work of a revolutionary; a revolutionary changes our sense of values.

Judged by the ends of Hindu Nationalism, Jinnah is the worst sinner alive; judged by the ends of Islam, he is the greatest architect of modern Islam in India. He has given it a 'habitation and a name.'

That the League has been built up into a powerful organisation is proof enough of Jinnah's correct direction of Muslim affairs. And whatever the Congress leaders may have been saying about the communal character of the Muslim League, they were none too comfortable about its growing strength. The mere fact that it had at its helm of affairs a man of Jinnah's integrity of character and determination of mind was enough to put them on their guard. Being in power in seven provinces, however, their precautionary measures took the shape of 'mopping-up' operations like the Mass Contact Movement, formation of pure Congress Ministries and insistence on those who would be taken in the Ministries to abjure the League and have

no programme of their own. They proposed to nip the evil in the bud. That it was a great tactical mistake of the Congress is shown beyond doubt by what followed these attempts. The Congress High Command thought they would kill the League just by the sheer weight of their authority, by the largeness of their organisation and by the force of their numbers. They wanted to overawe the Muslim mind with its newly-acquired greatness by ordering the *Bande Matram* to be sung as the national song, by flying the Congress tricolour flag as the national flag, and by introducing their *Vidya Mandir* and Wardha Scheme of Education and substitution of Urdu by Hindi. These were an impressive array of weapons against the Mussalmans. But they were wrong. They sadly misread the Muslim character. They showed that they lacked complete understanding of what the Muslims hold first as the object of loyalty. The Mussalmans could be hoodwinked only so long as there was none to make them conscious of their present position and their past heritage. Once Jinnah had done that job, they could not be deceived. The Congress yearned to be the inheritor of the British Power on the score of numbers, but it never cared to learn from the British their uncanny insight into a people's susceptibilities. The British succeed in their rule because they avoid to



come into conflict with the people's avowed beliefs. They would much rather insinuate their thoughts in the minds of the people by indirect and subtle methods. On the contrary the Congress chose just to ride roughshod over the susceptibilities of the Mussalmans. Whether it was arrogance or, as Jinnah put it, the Hindus had simply become "intoxicated with power," it could not bear good results for the Congress. As for Jinnah, he could have no better opportunity to expose the Hindu character of the Congress to the full view of the Mussalmans. Seizing instances after instances of the downright suppression of Muslim culture which flowed out of the Congress drive for *Ram Raj*, he hammered on them till he drove it home to the Mussalmans that Congress was another name for the Mahasabha. "To-day," he summed up the position, "Hindu mentality is being carefully nurtured and Muslims are being forced to accept Hindu ideals in their daily life. Have Muslims anywhere done anything of the sort? Have they anywhere sought to impose Muslim culture on the Hindus? Yet wherever Muslims have raised the slightest voice of protest against the imposition of Hindu culture on them they have been branded as communalists and disturbers of peace, and the repressive machinery of the Congress Governments has been set in motion against them. Take the cases

that have occurred in Bihar. Who have suffered suppression under the Congress Governments? It is the Mussalmans. Against whom are the oppressive measures taken, prohibitory orders issued, and among whom are arrests made? It is the Muslims."¹

For twenty-seven months Congress remained in power and for twenty-seven months the Muslim League under Jinnah's guidance remained on the watch, gathering instances of the manifestation of Hindu mentality at work, till was piled up the Pirpur Report. Gandhi's seventeen-year long unchallenged leadership of Indian politics could not have done for the "unification" of Indians, what twenty-seven months of Congress regime did to disrupt that "unity" facade. The Congress Rule was a Godsend chance to Jinnah to bring out the fact that the Congress regime could not but be a communal regime of the Hindu majority. Jinnah's agitation culminated in the demand for a Royal Commission to investigate into the grievances of Mussalmans. Thus he proved beyond doubt that the Hindus and Mussalmans were two distinct people and that the Mussalmans could never allow themselves to be sunk in the nationalism of Hindus which was sought to be built up under the patronage of the British, to whom the logic of imperialism

¹ *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah.*



had made appear the administrative unity they gave India as their greatest handiwork and the sure road to the evolution of ONE NATION.

The War intervened in the continuance of the Hindu regime and with the stroke of a genius, Jinnah marked that moment for thanksgiving on Deliverance from the Congress Rule. Not thousand speeches from hundreds of platforms for millions of hours could bring the point of Muslim's sheer otherness from the Hindus as did that one command of Jinnah to observe the termination of the Congress Rule as the Day of Deliverance. It showed in one flashing moment that the Muslims differed from Hindus as 'day from night.' That one act of Jinnah outweighs years of arguments on the cultural, conceptual and ideological differences between Hinduism and Islam. Thus, so to say, Jinnah solidified the Muslim grievances into a body, into a shape, visible to the naked eye. Arthur Moore, the famous ex-editor of the *Statesman* compared that decision of Jinnah with the one Winston Churchill took on the Germans' declaration of war against Soviet Russia. Obliterating altogether from mind his ideological differences with the Russian Communism and his years of passionate opposition to the Soviet experiment, Churchill announced that very evenin

of 22nd June, 1941, to the Russians and the world at large that Britain stood with Russia. In one instant he had the friendship of the 200 million Russians on his side. This could not have been achieved by any number of agreements, pacts and protocols. Britain's deliverance from the Nazi threat of invasion might well be put down to that one moment on the mike in which Winston Churchill uttered that one-half sentence with complete unreserve—"I assure the Russians that they are not alone: Britain is on the side of Russia."

No doubt, creating opportunities and making new environs is an act of genius, but making use of the opportunities offered to man as free gifts by Nature is also an act of genius. Indeed, these opportunities are the supreme tests of the talents men have been endued with. Jinnah's success in a great measure is due to his ability to put to the fullest use any opportunity that arose which could strengthen his position. He made use of the Congress opposition to the Federation part of the Government of India Act for his own purpose. He put the Congress regime to the use of exposing the Hindu character of its Ministries. And finally he consummated his success of exposing the Congress on the termination of its Ministries in that remarkable declaration for the observance of



the DELIVERANCE DAY.

Again, Jinnah's observance of the Deliverance Day was only an aspect of his fundamental view that democracy of the Western conception was not suitable to India. The disease of Indian politics, according to Jinnah, as he diagnosed it in his famous article to the *Time and Tide*, was the want of realisation that the Parliamentary form of Government was not suited to India. "Democratic systems based on the concept of a homogeneous nation such as England are very definitely not applicable to heterogeneous countries such as India and this simple fact is the root cause of India's all constitutional ills. . . The British people must realise that Hinduism and Islam 'represent two distinct and separate civilisations' and, moreover, are 'as distinct from one another in origin, tradition and manner of life as are nations of Europe. . . ' They are in fact two different nations, and if this fact is accepted by no less an authority than the Joint Select Committee, the Muslim people have cause to question the wisdom of the British Government in forcing on India the Western system of democracy without the qualifications and limitations to which the system must be subject to make it at all suitable for Indian conditions. . . A parliamentary system based on the majority principle must

inevitably mean the rule of the major nation. Experience has proved that, whatever the economic and political programme of any political party, the Hindu, as a general rule, will vote for his caste-fellow and the Muslim for his co-religionist." Finally: "Western democracy is totally unsuited for India and its imposition will be resisted by the Mussalmans."¹

Anyone who can face realities will see that Jinnah spoke nothing but the bare truth. Hindus and Muslims are totally different. Indeed all Muslim movements in India during the last two centuries have been movements for the purification of Islamic teachings of the alien and anti-Islamic encrustation of Hinduism. That naturally rules out the possibility of any amalgamation of Hindus and Mussalmans, much less absorption of Islam into Hinduism. And the majority-rule concept of State means little else; that ensures that a permanent Hindu majority will be imposed on the hundred million Mussalmans. Western democracy implies a homogeneous atmosphere which certainly does not obtain in India. The homogeneity of atmosphere is so essential to the operation of democracy that the great British political scientist Harold J. Laski discussing the future of democracy in England in reference

¹ *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah.*



to the Labour problem fears that the growing cleavage between the two classes, Capitalist and Labour, would cause democracy to cease function in Britain. "We have got to build," he warns, "an equal society in the next generation, or we must abandon the democratic experiment; that is the stark alternative before us:"¹ If such a prospect is conceivable for Britain, what chance has democracy to work in the heterogeneous conditions of India.

Jinnah's work was threefold: on one side he had to convince the British that the Western democracy was not applicable to India because Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations, which precluded the essential prerequisite of democracy, namely, homogeneity of Society; on the other, he was making it clear to the Hindus that Mussalmans would not accept their rule and the only way for the advancement of the country lay in an agreement between the two peoples on the basis of sharing the power equally; and on the third side he was convincing the Mussalmans that Congress stood for nothing else than Hindu rule and would cause irretrievable disaster to their culture and existence if they did not rise against it in time. Jinnah performed this three-sided stupendous work in the 27-month long regime of the

¹ *Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time.*

Congress, culminating in the Deliverance Day. The very fact that the Mussalmans celebrated that day with genuine enthusiasm showed that Jinnah's call had penetrated into the Muslim hearts; now they clearly saw the implication of the Congress rule. To both the other parties, the day symbolised the Muslim determination to oppose any constitution which regarded them a minority to be thrown at the mercy of Hindu majority.

On the commencement of World War II on 2nd September, 1939, the Indian political situation had crystallised into this shape: the Congress resigned from the Ministries and demanded a declaration of the British war aims which should envisage complete independence for India and the calling forthwith of a Constituent Assembly on the basis of adult franchise to frame a constitution for India; on the other hand the Mussalmans, under Jinnah's leadership, demanded the consideration *de novo* of the existing constitutional plan on the basis of two nations; the Mussalmans to be treated as a separate nation and not a minority.

So long Jinnah's efforts had converged on the organisation of the Mussalmans. That work should be deemed to have gone a long way by this date. Jinnah illustrated this fact of Muslim consolidation in an interesting

manner in a speech he delivered at Lahore.¹ "After the war was declared (he said), the Viceroy naturally wanted help from the Muslim League. It was only then that he realised that the Muslim League was a power. For it will be remembered that up to the time of the declaration of war, the Viceroy never thought of me but of Gandhi and Gandhi alone. I have been the leader of an important party in the Legislature for a considerable time, larger than the one I have the honour to lead at present, the Muslim League Party in the Central Legislature. Yet the Viceroy never thought of me before. Therefore, when I got this invitation from the Viceroy along with Mr. Gandhi, I wondered within myself why I was so suddenly promoted and then I concluded that the answer was the 'All-India Muslim League' whose President I happen to be. I believe that was the worst shock that the Congress High Command received, because it challenged their sole authority to speak on behalf of India. And it is quite clear from the attitude of Mr. Gandhi and the High Command that they have not yet recovered from that shock. My point is that I want you to realise the value, the importance, the significance of organising ourselves."² Therefore, on Mussalmans Jinnah had only one point to emphasise: "Depend

¹ Muslim League Session, Lahore 1940.

² *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah.*

on yourselves. That is your only safeguard and the best safeguard." These efforts of Jinnah to organise the Mussalmans were crowned with the emergence of a Muslim flag, a Muslim platform and a Muslim policy. And now, finally, Jinnah was on the point of defining "the ideal and true goal of Muslim India," but of that, later.

Having shown that Mussalmans and Hindus were different, Jinnah was, at the moment under consideration, marshalling, all his strength to make it further clear that not only the hundred million Mussalmans were different, but a separate nation and not a minority as had so far been propagated. Jinnah's argument was that the Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine, and indeed they belong to two different civilisations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their outlooks on life and of life are different. Hindus and Muslims derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and, likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority; must

lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state. This argument reached its full pitch in Jinnah's famous declaration: "We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hundred million, and what is more we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilisation, language and literature, art and architecture, name and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitude and ambitions. In short, *we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law we are a nation.*"¹

While Jinnah was thus exerting his strength to establish the fact that the hundred million Mussalmans were a separate nation in India, Gandhi's Congress was busy asking for declaration of war aims. The Viceroy said: 'I have made the declaration.'² The Congress said, 'No, we want another kind of declaration. You must declare now and at once that India is free and independent with the right to frame its own constitution by a constituent assembly to be elected on the basis of adult franchise. This Assembly will

¹ *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah.*

² The August 1940 Declaration.

of course satisfy the minorities' legitimate interests.' Thus the idea of a Constituent Assembly was assiduously preached. The aim was somehow to get the British committed to the idea of the Hindu majority ruling over the Mussalmans. The war, Congress regarded the best weapon to coerce the British into commitments. That was "the chance of their lives" to wrench from the British what they desired to take. That was equally a grave moment for the Mussalmans. Jinnah attacked the concept of the Constituent Assembly with characteristic vigour and incisiveness. Jinnah exposed the motive behind the idea in clear terms. His contention was that first of all the proposal was impracticable. It was absurd to ask the ruling power to abdicate in favour of a Constituent Assembly. Secondly, what about the Mussalmans? Suppose the solid body of Muslim representatives do not agree with the non-Muslim majority in the Constituent Assembly, what will happen? The Mussalmans had no right to disagree with regard to anything that the Assembly may do in framing a national constitution of the huge sub-continent of India, except those matters which were germane to the safeguards for the minorities. So the Muslims were given the privilege to disagree only with regard to what may be called strictly safeguards of the rights and interests of minorities. The



proposal was based on the assumption that as soon as the constitution came into operation, the British hand would disappear. Jinnah further analysed the suggestion that in the event of disagreement between Hindus and Mussalmans, a tribunal would be appointed. His question was who would appoint the tribunal? And suppose if any agreed tribunal was possible and the award was made and decision given, who would be there to see that the award was implemented or carried out in accordance with the terms of the award? Who will see that it was honoured in practice? The third party which could be supposed to be impartial, the British, would have disappeared. Therefore, what will be the sanction behind the award which will enforce it? The answer could only be: *the Hindu majority*. And that was precisely the bone of contention. The Mussalmans were not willing to throw themselves at the mercy of the Hindu majority, just by being given the name of a minority.

When Gandhi said: "To me Hindus, Muslims, Parsis, Harijans, are all alike. I cannot be frivolous when I talk of Qaid-i-Azam Jinnah. He is my brother." Pat came Jinnah's retort: "The only difference is this, that brother Gandhi has three votes and I have only one."

Gandhi wanted the Mussalmans to come

in the Constituent Assembly and then "declare there is nothing common between Hindus and Muslims." Then alone would he give up all hope of Hindu-Muslim unity. So he wanted the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of ascertaining the views of the Mussalmans. The idea bears a great resemblance to the proverbial spider's web. Jinnah's answer was: 'You can know the Muslim mind right now.' There could be Hindu-Muslim understanding at once, if Gandhi honestly acknowledged the fact that the Congress represented the Hindus and the League represented the Mussalmans. Gandhi did not represent anybody except the solid body of the Hindu people. Non-recognition of this fundamental point was the main hitch in agreement between the Hindus and Mussalmans. "Why should not Mr. Gandhi be proud to say (Jinnah asked) 'I am a Hindu, Congress has solid Hindu backing?' I am not ashamed of saying that I am a Mussalman." "I am right," he further asserted, "and I hope and think even a blind man must have been convinced by now that the Muslim League has solid backing of the Mussalmans of India. Why then all this camouflage? Why all these machinations? Why all these methods to coerce the British to overthrow the Mussalmans? Why this declaration of non-co-operation? Why this threat of civil disobedience? And why fight



for a Constituent Assembly for the sake of ascertaining whether the Mussalmans agree or they do not agree? *Why not come as a Hindu leader proudly representing your people and let me meet you proudly representing the Mussalmans.*"¹ There was of course no response from the Mahatma.

As for the British, Jinnah's demand was that the "entire problem of the future constitution of India should be examined *de novo*." To that the Viceroy, on behalf of His Majesty's Government replied that the "declaration I made with the approval of His Majesty's Government on October the 13th last does not exclude examination of any part either of the Act of 1935 or of the policy and plans on which it is based." That is to say, Jinnah had succeeded in convincing the British Government that the Mussalmans were determined to oppose any constitution based on the concept of Hindu majority and Muslim minority with the unitary centre as its focal point. Jinnah's stand was clear, he will "not let either the British or Mr. Gandhi rule the Mussalmans."

¹ *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah.*



CSL

VII

"It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of our troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time." —Jinnah

With this, the stage for the determination of the "true goal of Muslim India" had come. What was the goal of the Mussalmans? Jinnah answered the question at Lahore. India must be partitioned into Hindu India and Muslim India. The Muslim-majority provinces in the north-west and north-east should form Muslim Homelands. That is the only way for "our people to develop to the fullest our spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life in a way that we think best and in consonance with our own ideals and according to the genius of our people." In one word—PAKISTAN. The goal of Muslim India was determined.

No sooner the Lahore Resolution was



passed than the threatening question was being asked all over India: "What is Pakistan?" Hindu press and Hindu leaders described it as 'cutting the baby,' 'killing the cow,' 'vivisecting the country' and so on. In fact, it is nothing but the hundred million Muslims' determination to pattern their life on the principles and ideals of Islam in complete independence of Hindus in the Muslim majority provinces which are their natural homelands. Every nation in the world is shaping out its policies according to its own pattern of life; in India, the Mussalmans propose to do the same in their independent states. Pakistan is simply the consummation of Jinnah's assertion which he had made earlier on the support of the entire body of the Mussalmans that "... Muslim India will never agree to submit its future destiny and fate or its rights in the governance of this country, or in the making of any future constitution, into the hands of a tribunal of Mr. Gandhi's conception, or of any other variety; nor are we prepared to accept the final arbitrament of Great Britain. WE MUST AND SHALL BE THE SOLE AND FINAL JUDGES OF WHAT IS BEST FOR US." By the Lahore Resolution the Mussalmans merely exercised their right of being the arbiters of their own fate. Unmindful of Hindu threats and their unbridled fury, Jinnah was now concentrating



on the achievement of the Muslim goal. "Achieve Pakistan or perish"¹—that is the watchword which he gave to his people.

"I am asked," Jinnah said, "will the British agree to the basic and fundamental principles of the Lahore Resolution, namely, to create independent Muslim States in the north-western and eastern zones of India? Whether they agree or whether they do not, we shall fight for it to the last ditch." To Jinnah self-reliance and self organisation are the central points of all purposes. **WE SHALL FIGHT FOR IT TO THE LAST DITCH**—that merely is an articulation which he gave to the will and determination of Mussalmans, the will and determination which Jinnah was at pains to awaken in their minds right from the first day when he demanded of Mussalmans to "have faith in themselves."

¹ What is the goal of the All-India Muslim League? What is its ideology and what is its policy? Let me tell you as clearly as I can possibly define it, that the goal of the All-India Muslim League is this: We want the establishment of completely independent States in the north-west and eastern zones of India and full control finally of defence, foreign affairs, communications, customs, currency and exchange, etc. *We do not want in any circumstances a constitution of an all-India character with one Government at the Centre. We will never agree to that. If we once agree to that, let me tell you, the Muslims will be absolutely wiped out of existence. We shall never be tributaries of any power or any government at the Centre so far as the north-west and eastern zones of our free national homelands are concerned.* (Jinnah's Presidential Address at Madras Muslim League Session, 1941.)



Gandhi's verdict on Jinnah's scheme was expressed in a three-lettered word—SIN.

Partition was a sin. This verdict was pronounced in 1940. In 1944 Gandhi met Jinnah in Bombay to devise ways and means to "part as brothers." From "sin" to "partition as between brothers" is the change which Jinnah forced in Gandhi and speaks for the tenacity of purpose and superb skill with which he pursued his goal and guided the destiny of the Mussalmans. I shall relate the story of this *change* in the fewest words possible.

While the Congress was bent on making as much hay as it could while the *war-sun* shone by making use of Britons' difficulties to coerce them into conceding their demands at the cost of the Mussalmans and other minorities, Jinnah with bated breath struggled on to undo the machinations of the Mahatma and his disciples. It was a grim struggle that Jinnah had to wage. The more the British were in tight corner the greater was the insistence of Congress on having its way. So that when Cripps came to India in March 1942, the Congress High Command took it as an indication of the British weakness and their keenness to placate Gandhi.

Jinnah had made the League position very clear on the issue of participation in the war effort. He would, of course, not obstruct



the war effort. But he wanted from the British the assurance that nothing would be done—he knew how hard the Congress was pressing the British to carry out their dictates—that would prejudice and prejudice the issue of Pakistan. And if assured of full and effective share of power in the Government, he would join the British in the prosecution of the war. Jinnah's analysis of the situation was this: "We feel it is not only Great Britain alone, but also India, which is in danger. Situated as we are, we feel that if Great Britain goes under and the machinery of the Government of India breaks down, there is real danger to us. Apart from other reasons we do not want Nazis to win this war. We want Great Britain to win this war. There is no question of our changing the masters. We want to take our freedom from Great Britain. For that reason, we, from the beginning, did not place any obstacle in the way of Great Britain. For instance, in spite of the fact that Pakistan is our anchor-sheet, we did not demand Pakistan as a condition precedent for our whole-hearted support to the British Government. We only asked for an assurance that the British Government would not let us down by entering into an agreement either interim or final with the Congress. It was to be purely a war contract without prejudice to the position of the conflicting

parties now or in the future. We promise to give a great deal in men, money and other materials—in fact, the whole-hearted support of 90 million of the Muslims. I am prepared to bring to the common pool all this, but I must have equal, real and effective share in the power. This is described 'as uncompromising proposals of Mr. Jinnah' by the apologists of the wooden and ante-diluvian Government of India. They want our support on the assurance that we shall be remembered as loyal servants after the war and will even be given a *baksheesh*." **CO-OPERATION WITH AUTHORITY IN THE GOVERNMENT AT THE CENTRE AND IN THE PROVINCES**—that was the basis on which Jinnah was prepared to

¹ The Muslim League had passed the following resolution on the same subject on 7th June, 1940: "The grave world situation demands serious efforts on the part of every Indian for the defence of his country and the Working Committee calls upon the Government of India to prepare the country in an organised manner to meet every eventuality. The Committee is constrained to state that the proposals for the defence of India indicated in the statements of their Excellencies the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief as well as the statements of some provincial Governments are wholly inadequate to meet the urgent requirements of the situation. The Committee, therefore, authorises its President to enter into negotiations with his Excellency the Viceroy with a view to exploring the possibility of devising prompt and effective measures to mobilise the country's resources for the purpose of intensifying war efforts and the defence of India. The Committee is of the view that unless a satisfactory basis of close co-operation is agreed upon and the Muslim League and such other parties as are willing to undertake the responsibility for the defence of the country in the face of imminent danger, the real purpose and object will not be served and achieved.—*Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah.*



pledge the support of the entire body of the Mussalmans.

That was Jinnah's position, clear-cut and understandable. On the other hand, the Congress was motivated with the sole purpose of, somehow, coercing the Government into installing them in supreme authority over all other nationalities in India. "The acid test of Mr. Amery's ability," said Satya-murti—the late Deputy Leader of the Congress Party in the Central Assembly—"and earnestness will be his saying to the Muslim Leaguers, no Pakistan, no coalition ministries, no impossible safeguards, *you must settle with the majority; once he says that, the rest will be easy. . .*" The Congress game was clear. They did not want independence of India. What they wanted was, under the overlordship of Britian, power and patronage to dominate the Muslims and the rest of the minorities. In short they wanted "that the British Government should police the Hindu *Raj* in this country." And to achieve that objective, they were inventing such things as Constituent Assembly, Provisional National Government and so on. These institutions were intended to serve the purpose of the spider's parlour. Once the Muslims and others were in, Hindus should know how to deal with them. Jinnah saw through the game. It is Jinnah's great speciality



—a speciality which has literally saved the Mussalmans from submergence into Hinduism—namely, the ability to understand Gandhi's game. Explaining once what penetrating study was required to follow the meanings of the "oracle of Delphi" Jinnah once said: "... In order to understand Mr. Gandhi, you have to study and go deep into the thing." Jinnah invariably pays Gandhi the compliment of going "deep into the thing" and comes out with hidden meanings, completely screened from the view of ordinary mortals. Thus Jinnah constitutes himself a great disturber of the peace of mind of Gandhi. He warns people against Gandhian designs on their freedom.

Gandhi's mind was further perturbed by the Viceroy's August 1940 Declaration in which he said that the British Government "could not contemplate transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life. Nor could they be parties to the coercion of such elements into submission to such a government." That was the answer to the Muslim League's persistent demand that nothing should be done in the way of framing a constitution for India without the prior consent and approval of the Muslim



League—the authoritative representative of the hundred million Mussalmans.

However, Gandhi did not lose heart. He had in his armoury the weapon of civil disobedience movement. It may work. Or a few more 'blandishment' tactics may be put to use. For instance, why not offer Jinnah the premiership of the proposed National Government? One job could not harm anybody. Another parlour of the spider. And so the famous C. R.¹ made his "sporting offer."

Addressing the British he said: "In answer to Mr. Amery's difficulty as to the minorities, I may make a sporting offer that if His Majesty's Government agree to a provisional national Government being formed at once, I shall undertake to persuade my colleagues in the Congress to agree to the Muslim League being invited to nominate the Prime Minister and let him form a national Government as he would consider best..." Referring to this 'sporting offer' in the Central Assembly Jinnah said: "Now, sir, why does he (C. R.) not invite the prospective Prime Minister, to have a talk with him, instead of firing it off to the *Daily Herald*² and saying 'I shall persuade my colleagues of the Working Committee to

¹ C. Rajgopalacharia, ex-Premier, Madras.

² London.



this, that and the other?' I do ask my Honourable friends—is this business? And to-day Mr. Rajagopalacharia justifies why he did not make that offer to the Muslim League. I tell you I cannot restrain my utter astonishment and amazement as to how that mind works. It is impossible to understand it... He says that 'the British Government did not take any notice of the "sporting offer" and some critics suggested it should have been made to Mr. Jinnah and not to the British Government... it would have been improper to make it to Mr. Jinnah in the first instance. Mr. Jinnah would then have had legitimate ground for considering it an insult and retorting that he was not after jobs.' I ask if Mr. Amery had accepted this offer and then if that offer had been made to me, would it not have been open to the same retort, because it is the same offer and the terms are the same? I would have, according to Mr. Rajagopalacharia said, 'both Mr. Amery and Mr. Rajagopalacharia have combined and are insulting me and that I am not here for jobs.' Do give some credit to other people at least for commonsense. Is this really the explanation? (An Honourable Member: Read the latter portion also.) I am quite willing to read the other part. He says: 'Assuming that Mr. Jinnah accepted the offer, it would not be in the speaker's power to implement it



unless there was the prior commitment by the British Government to part with power.' His argument is,—if I had accepted it, it was not in his power to implement it. It may not be in his power to implement, but the latest and authoritative pronouncement of the British Government is this: 'If you can put your heads together and bring about some agreement we are willing to consider it.' Then what is the use of making this offer to Mr. Amery over the head of the Muslim League?"

Thus Jinnah exposed the motive behind the 'sporting offer', namely, to hoodwink the British public.

Further, discussing the implication of the demand for national Government on the same occasion, Jinnah said: "... There are far-reaching implications. It will mean fundamental alterations and changes in the constitution in order to constitute the Cabinet and when that Cabinet is constituted, it will be responsible to the elected members of the Legislature. Mr. Bhulabhai Desai throughout his speech only emphasised two things: Democracy, democracy, democracy, and a national government. What is the use? Whatever that Cabinet may be, will be responsible to this Legislature—in which Mr. Bhulabhai Desai can command two-thirds of the elected members. I WILL PITY THE MAN WHO HAPPENS TO BE



IN THAT CABINET AND DOES NOT OBEY THE CONGRESS COMMAND AND THE CONGRESS MANDATE."

That was the upshot of the Congress game. Its entire effort was to make itself supreme in the government of the land and then deal with other elements in the Indian body-politic as it desired. That game was played differently at different times; sometime it was cajolery, sometime coercion, sometime calumny and vituperation and all the time trickery and machination. All this Jinnah watched like a hawk. This long Congress game of double-crossing and coercion ultimately reached its acme in the rejection of the Cripps Proposals in March 1942 and the starting of the 'open rebellion' in August, 1942.

If such were the Congress attitude, the British yielded not a whit to it in their efforts to throw the Mussalmans to the wolves. Their programme was determined by the short-sighted policy of placating the Congress. Of course the British could not now ignore the Muslim League. And that is why they gave the Muslim League the assurance that the plan and considerations underlying the Government of India Act were open to revision. That was an important gain for Jinnah. But it was foolish on the part of the Government to suppose that since that assurance was given,



the Mussalmans were completely won over. The Muslim League could not put its full weight on the side of the Government on any other basis but of equal partnership. Jinnah had refused to accept *baksheesh*. Thus the Government remained without the full-blood co-operation of the Muslim League. Faced with this situation, the Viceroy started to play the same game that the Congress had been playing for long, namely, to disrupt the Muslim solidarity by throwing baits of offices to prominent Mussalmans 'over the head' of their authoritative organisation.

Plan for the expansion of the Viceroy's Council was put in and the famous National Defence Council was formed. Well-known Muslim leaders were invited to join both the Viceroy's Council and the National Defence Council. Among those invited to participate in this plan were the Premiers of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam and Sir Sultan Ahmad and Begum Shah Nawaz—all Muslim Leaguers. The Viceroy said to the League: 'Well, there you are. Go on sulking. I have got your men on my side all the same.' It was a direct challenge to the representative authority of the Muslim League. And Jinnah accepted the challenge. At once he called upon the Muslim Premiers of the Bengal, Punjab and Assam and others to keep out of the Viceroy's Council and the Defence Council.



The Premiers advanced the argument that they were being invited to join the National Defence Council as Premiers of provinces and not as Muslim leaders. A first-class crisis hovered over the organisation of the Muslim League. If Muslim Leaguers could be alienated from the organisation like that, indeed that was the end of Muslim solidarity. Jinnah called a meeting of the Working Committee to consider the situation on August 24th, 1941. Muslim India was in an extremely agitated mood. Not only the British Government had played a trick, but the Mussalmans of the highest rank had succumbed to it. Between July 22nd, the day the Viceroy made his announcement about the expansion of the Executive Council and the formation of National Defence Council, and the holding of the Working Committee meeting on August 24th, Muslim India held its breath. This was an acid test of Jinnah's reorganisational work of the last five years. If the Muslims came through the crisis, they deserved to live as an organised and distinct body, otherwise they were doomed.

On August 24th the Working Committee met in Bombay. The issue before the Committee was whether the Premiers were invited by the Viceroy to join the National Defence Council as Mussalmans or as Premiers of

their provinces? Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan, Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq and Sir Saadullah held that they were invited as heads of their respective Governments and not as prominent Mussalmans. But Jinnah said: 'No, you are invited as Mussalmans to represent the Muslim community. You are to be held up to the world as representative Mussalmans who are whole-heartedly with the Government.' But how did Jinnah substantiate that point? Well, he had simply to read out to the Committee the letter which he had received from the Governor of Bombay on July 20th, two days before the Viceroy's announcement. It read:

Ganeshkhind, July 20.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

His Excellency the Viceroy has asked me to let you know his intentions on the matters which follow. I had hoped that I would be able to see you myself in order that I might convey this message to you personally, as was his desire: but, unfortunately, now that I am in a position to give you the message, I am not entirely fit and I am therefore writing to convey it to you by this letter, which I am sending down to Bombay by messenger.

The Viceroy has continued to have very much in mind the whole situation in regard to the war effort and the association of non-official opinion with the prosecution of the war. The obstacles, however, to any settlement on the basis of the complete offer of



August last, which emerged so clearly during the discussions last autumn, still exist, to his very great regret as the last few months, and the reactions to the Secretary of State's statement in the House of Commons on April 22, have made clear. In these circumstances, it is equally clear that he cannot look for the degree of support from the major parties, for the proposals embodied in the August offer, which he desires. Nevertheless, the burden of the conduct of the war on the Central Government has greatly increased, and for administrative reasons it is essential to proceed with some increase in the membership of the Viceroy's Council within the terms of the August offer. The Viceroy, accordingly, is anxious that you should know that he is now, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, creating five new portfolios.

* * *

In addition, the Viceroy does not feel that, because of the difficulty in securing the support of the major political parties, it is possible to delay further the more active association of non-official Indian opinion with the prosecution of the war. He is, accordingly, establishing, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, a National Defence Council. The Council will consist of some thirty members, nine of whom will be drawn from the Indian States. *The Viceroy regards it as essential that the great Muslim community should be represented on that Council by persons of the highest prominence and capacity. He has accordingly, invited the Premiers of Assam, Bengal, Punjab and Sind to serve as members of it, and he has extended invitations also to certain other*

prominent Muslims, such as Sir Mohammad Usman. He has considered whether he should invite you to let him have any suggestions as to the possible personnel for this Council, but being aware, as he is, of your general attitude, he has concluded that it would be preferable not to embarrass you by inviting you to make suggestions.

* * *

The letter made it clear that the Mussalman Premiers, as others, were invited, firstly, in terms of the August offer about which the leader of the Muslim League had made an authoritative decision, and secondly, that the purpose behind the invitation was that the "great Muslim community should be represented by persons of the highest prominence and capacity." No doubt, the Secretary of State for India was greatly pleased to find the invitations accepted and was glad "to think that regardless of party leaders and in defiance of party discipline, patriotic Indians have come forward to work for India's defence."¹ This sinister pleasure however did not last long. Jinnah proved it to the hilt that the Muslim Premiers were in the Council as representatives of the Mussalmans, and that manifestly on the part of the Government constituted an attempt to disrupt the Muslim organisation. The Muslim Premiers could not answer the stern logic of circumstances and had to bow before the

¹ August 1st, 1941, in the House of Commons.



decision of the Muslim League Working Committee. Thus the British Government was foiled in its attempt to wean away the Mussalmans from the course of owning single-minded allegiance to their authoritative organisation. The Muslim consolidation in India has been as prickly a thorn in the side of the British Government as it is in that of the Hindu Congress. It is a sad commentary on the mentality of the 'nationalist' press that it described Jinnah's act of demanding the resignation of League members from the National Defence Council as 'dictatorial.' These are the very people who so much clamour for the necessity of party discipline and applaud each and every act of Gandhi on that score.

I have said it was a great crisis for the Mussalmans; it was an acid test for Jinnah's five-year work of Muslim reorganisation and by coming through it successfully, the Muslim League showed it to the Hindus and the British that no longer could the Mussalmans be disrupted. Jinnah had now given them a clear aim and a tenacity of purpose which was hard to be breached. To the British, through the Governor of Bombay, Jinnah said simply this: "Would it be creditable for any individual prominent or capable Muslim, belonging to an organisation, to accept the invitation contrary to the position and the



attitude taken up by that organisation, and would it do any credit to the Government if they succeed in alluring them and create a breach in the organisation, in the hope that he may throw up his allegiance to the party to which he belongs in order to accept the invitation of His Excellency? I maintain that the great Muslim community is represented authoritatively only by the All-India Muslim League Organisation. Persistence in the course will not improve matters, but on the contrary it will lead to bitterness on the part of the Muslim League which up to the present moment, fortunately, does not exist, however emphatically we have disapproved of the policy which has been pursued by His Majesty's Government and the Viceroy." That was a lesson which the British richly deserved to be taught.

Now we come to the Cripps phase of Indian politics.

When Cripps came to India in those dark days of early 1942 with the great fortress of Singapore fallen, *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* sunk and the Japanese invasion of India dangerously imminent, the Congress called *hurrah* for two reasons: first, in its opinion, the sending of a conciliation mission at that time was a sure sign of British weakness, whose purpose could be no other than placating the great Congress; second, of all the



people, Cripps was the most agreeable of messengers. Was not Cripps the great friend of Congress, the man who had spent many a day enjoying the aristocratic-cum-socialist hospitality of that *peer* of Nehru family—JAWAHARLAL. Sure, it was a great victory. But Cripps may be all right as an individual, he could not be so obliging in the official capacity of Churchill's representative. The proposals Cripps brought to India greatly disappointed the Congress and Gandhi and his great friend, Nehru. Why? Whatever may have been said to be the reason by the Congress pundits, the real answer to this *why* is the non-acceding provinces clause of the Proposals. That is, if any province (subject to conditions) desired to go out of the Indian Union, it could, and, further, a combination of such provinces could form a separate union of their own. The Congress pundits said it was an acceptance of the Lahore Resolution; it was Pakistan. And that, sure enough, made the Proposals totally unacceptable. Writing in the *New York Times Magazine*, a few months later (July 1942) Jawaharlal Nehru said: "Thirty years ago, the British Government introduced the principle of separate religious electorates in India, a fatal thing which has come in the way of development of political parties. Now they have tried to introduce the idea of partitioning

India not only into two but possibly many separate parts. This was one of the reasons which led to bitter resentment of the Cripps Proposals. *The All-India Congress could not agree to this.*"

Non-accession of provinces was, however, subject to conditions which made well-nigh impossible the materialisation of another union. Sir Stafford was at pains to stress this point on the Congress High Command. He said: 'Don't bother about the clause ; it is merely an eye-wash. Get the Muslims in the Union and there will be no getting out of it.' A Congress publication¹ registered Sir Stafford's mind in these words: "Sir Stafford Cripps had argued that in Constituent Assembly the majority would get a splendid opportunity to convince the minority of the baselessness of its fears and induce it to give up its separatist ambitions. *Secondly, the alignment of communities, it was argued, was such as to reduce the chances of any province exercising the right to nil.*" Yet the Congress rejected the Proposals. Gandhi's inordinate ambition to be ONE AND ALL in India could not entertain a proposition which even remotely conceived of partnership with others, and to that ambition must be put down the ruin of Indian politics.

¹ *Why Cripps Failed*, by M. Subrahmanyam, the then Joint Editor of the *Hindustan Times*.



Jinnah gave a clear lead on this occasion and the Working Committee of the Muslim League passed a resolution in the following terms :

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The Committee, while expressing their gratification that the possibility of Pakistan is recognised by implication by providing for the establishment of two or more independent Unions in India, regret that the proposals of His Majesty's Government, embodying the fundamentals, are not open to any modification and, therefore, no alternative proposals are invited. In view of the rigidity of the attitude of His Majesty's Government with regard to the fundamentals not being open to any modification, the Committee have no alternative but to say that the proposals in their present form are unacceptable to them for reasons given below :

(1) The Mussalmans, after twenty-five years of genuine efforts for the reconciliation of the two major communities and the bitter experience of the failure of such efforts, are convinced that it is neither just nor possible, in the interest of peace and happiness of the two peoples, to compel them to constitute one Indian Union, composed of the two principal nations—Hindus and Muslims—which appears to be the main object of His Majesty's Government, as adumbrated in the Preamble of the Draft Declaration, the creation of more than one union being relegated only to the realm of remote possibility and is purely illusory.

(2) In the Draft Declaration a constitu-

tion-making body has been proposed with the primary object of creating one Indian Union. So far as the Muslim League is concerned, it has finally decided that the only solution of India's constitutional problem is the partition of India into independent zones; and it will, therefore, be unfair to the Mussalmans to compel them to enter such a constitution-making body whose main object is the creation of a new Indian Union. With conditions as they are, it will be not only futile but on the contrary may exacerbate bitterness and animosity amongst the various elements in the country.

Besides the machinery which has been proposed for the creation of the constitution-making body, namely, that it will consist of members elected by newly elected Lower House of the eleven provinces upon the cessation of hostilities, as a single electoral college by the system of proportional representation, is a fundamental departure from the right of the Mussalmans hitherto enjoyed by them to elect their representatives by means of separate electorates, which is the only sure way in which true representatives of the Mussalmans can be chosen.

The constitution-making body will take decisions by a bare majority on all questions of most vital and paramount character involved in the framing of the constitution, which is a departure from the fundamental principles of justice and contrary to a constitutional practice so far followed in the various countries and dominions; and the Mussalmans, by agreeing to this will, instead of exercising their right and judgment as a constituent



factor, be at the entire mercy of the constitution-making body, in which they will be a minority of about twenty-five per cent.

(3) The right of non-accession to the Union, as contemplated in the Draft Declaration, has been conceded, presumably, in response to the insistent demands by the Mussalmans for the partition of India, but the method and procedure laid down are such as to negative the professed object, for, in the draft proposals, the right of non-accession has been given to the existing provinces, which has been formed from time to time for administrative convenience and on no logical basis.

The Mussalmans cannot be satisfied by such a declaration on a vital question affecting their future destiny, and demand a clear and precise pronouncement on the subject. Any attempt to solve the future problem of India by the process of evading the real issues is to court disaster.

In the draft proposals no procedure has been laid down as to how the verdict of the province is to be obtained in favour of or against accession to one Union; but in the letter dated April 2, from the Secretary of Sir Stafford Cripps, addressed to the President of the All-India Muslim League, it is stated that "a province should reach the decision whether or not to stand out of the Union by a vote in the Legislative Assembly on a resolution to stand in. If the majority for accession to the Union is less than sixty per cent, the minority will have the right to demand a plebiscite of the adult popula-

tion." In this connection it must be emphasized that in the provinces where the Mussalmans are in a majority, as in the case of the major provinces of Bengal and Punjab, they are in a minority in the Legislative Assemblies; and in the Assemblies of Sind and North-West Frontier Province, the total number, namely, sixty and fifty respectively, is so small and the weightage given to the non-Muslims so heavy that it can be easily manipulated and a decision under such conditions cannot be the true criterion of ascertaining the real opinion of the Mussalmans of those provinces.

As regards the suggested plebiscite in the provinces in which the Mussalmans are in a majority, in the event of the requisite majority not being available in the Legislative Assemblies, the procedure laid down is that reference shall be made to the whole adult population of the provinces and not to the Mussalmans alone, which deny them the inherent right to self-determination.

It is in these clear terms that Jinnah guided the Working Committee of the Muslim League state the position of the Mussalmans. These clear terms contrast sharply with the ambiguous resolution passed by the Congress Working Committee demanding all for the Congress as the only party that *mattered* in India. Cripps' arrival had given much hope to Congressmen, but his Proposals did not satisfy the Congress' insatiable thirst for power. Congress hopes and disillusionment on arrival and after return of Cripps were

well portrayed by the *Hindustan Times*' cartoonist on April 14th, 1942. One part of the cartoon showed Cripps arriving with a Gandhi cap on and holding a hammer-and-sickle banner. This part was captioned: *He came*. The second part showed Cripps leaving the Viceroy's House in a black dinner jacket and top-hat—the symbol of British imperialism—with the caption: *He went*.

Now finding that the Government was not prepared to kneel down before the Congress, Gandhi ultimately came out with his threat of 'open rebellion.' The 'open rebellion' resolution was passed in August, 1942. The background of this resolution was the dangerously deteriorating situation in the Far East. Japanese were reported to be poised for an invasion of India. The British seemed to be at the lowest ebb of their power. And this was the moment which the great lover of Britain, who could not even contemplate the destruction of Westminster Abbey, chose for his 'open rebellion.' No wonder, the British regarded the August Resolution as the stabbing knife. And they naturally put to themselves the question: Is Gandhi pro-Japanese?

This 'open rebellion' was, however, not merely an attack against the British—they were one of the parties—the attack was really aimed at the *intransigent* Jinnah and

his people. Gandhi, later on, expressed his surprise at his immediate arrest after the passage of the resolution. He said that he wanted at least two to three weeks to elapse before the start of his campaign. During this *interim* he wanted to 'negotiate' with the Viceroy. What for? The purpose is clear. Having passed the resolution, that is, having loaded the pistol, he wanted during the interim to hold it against the Government with the threat: "So far I have tried to get power by other methods—*soft* methods. Well, you have not paid them any attention. But now I hold this pistol of 'open rebellion.' Settle with me right now. Give me all power. Don't bother about Muslims. I give you a week to make up your mind. And if you don't accept my demands, I will fire.' Right bandit style. And whose fate was being decided at the point of pistol? Not the Britons', but primarily of the Mussalmans. It was the only way to bring down Jinnah to dust. That is why Gandhi had the rudest shock when on the morrow of the 8th August, he found some constables waiting to escort him to the Agha Khan Palace. His shock is quite understandable. He was brutally denied the opportunity of holding the pistol of the August Resolution against the Head of the Government to help him coerce the Mussalmans into submission. But the Government was quick and definite. Perhaps



that is the only act of undoubted good in its otherwise long career of dilly-dallying and make-shift policy for which the Government rightly earned the gratitude of the teeming millions of India. For Mussalmans, of course, it was a most anxious time. Jinnah did not lose any time in declaring that the Mussalmans were opposed to the August Resolution; they were against the movement. At the same time he asked the Mussalmans to keep aloof from the campaign that was going around them; he also warned those who were carrying out the *great General's* command to 'do and die' not to meddle with Muslim affairs and not to provoke them into any counter-action. It is on record that the Mussalmans remained out of the movement *en masse*.



VIII

"If the British are really earnest and sincere to secure peace and happiness of the peoples of this sub-continent, the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing India into autonomous national states."

—Jinnah

With the arrest of the Congress leaders, the *open rebellion* movement was mostly running underground. *Above the ground* the exit of the Congress from the political scene made the role of ancillary bodies like the Liberal Federation, Mahasabha, and the Communist Party quite clear. They began to cry themselves hoarse for the release of 'national' leaders. Jinnah came in for severe arraignment from all sides for not giving support to the campaign of 'release leaders.' Despite all provocation he kept calm. His only answer was: 'Drop the pistol of the August Resolution and there can be peace.'

This hurricane movement for 'release leaders' on *humanitarian ground* even deceived some of the thoughtless and unwary Muslims into joining it—this quality of thoughtlessness being one in which some-



times Muslims make themselves most conspicuous. And having joined it, they wanted to bring some pressure to bear on Jinnah. Jinnah refused to be humbugged. But when some people who were supposed to be knowing the mind of Gandhi told him that the Mahatma was a changed man on the eve of his arrest in regard to the Muslim League, Jinnah declared at the Delhi Session (1943) of the All-India Muslim League :

"Nobody would welcome it more than myself if Mr. Gandhi were now really willing to come to a settlement with the Muslim League. Let me tell you that it will be the greatest day both for Hindus and Muslims. If that is Mr. Gandhi's desire, what is there to prevent him from writing direct to me? Who is there that can prevent him from doing so? What is the use of going to the Viceroy? Strong as this Government may be in this country, I cannot believe that they would have *the daring to stop such a letter* if it were sent to me. It would be a very serious thing indeed *if such a letter* were stopped... Mr. Gandhi gets all the information and knows what is going on. *If there is any change of heart in his party, he has only to drop a few lines to me.* Then the Muslim League will not fail, whatever may have been our controversies before."

This was declared in April 1943. On May 26th, 1943, the Government issued a press communique announcing the receipt of a letter from Gandhi for Jinnah. The Govern-



ment, however, "in accordance with their known policy in regard to correspondence or interviews with Mr. Gandhi... decided that this letter cannot be forwarded." This announcement was followed by a country-wide noise in the *nationalist* press that the Government had 'dared' to stop the letter, Jinnah's bluff was called, and so forth. It seemed as if the whole nationalist crowd had erected itself into one monster interrogation to Jinnah: WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO NOW? Jinnah was not to be ruffled. The one man in India who knows his mind and knows how much to say, how to say and when, was not to be brow-beaten by the hue and cry of the *nationalists* and the bleatings of some of the unwary Muslims. He came out with the quiet statement:

"The letter of Mr. Gandhi can only be construed as a move on his part to embroil the Muslim League to come into clash with the British Government solely for the purpose of helping his release, so that he would be free to do what he pleases thereafter. There is really no change of policy on the part of Mr. Gandhi and no genuine desire to meet the suggestion that I made in my speech during the session of the All-India Muslim League at Delhi. Although I have always been ready and willing to meet Mr. Gandhi or any other Hindu leader and shall be still glad to meet him, yet *merely expressing his desire to meet me is not the kind of ephemeral letter that I suggested in my speech*



that Mr. Gandhi should write, and which has been now stopped by Government... My speech was directed to meet the appeals that were made to me, and are now being made by Hindu leaders, that the Muslim League should do something towards the solution of the deadlock, and my suggestions about the kind of letter that Mr. Gandhi should write, were in response to those appeals, when I said that I myself saw no change of heart. There was no evidence of any change of policy on the part of Mr. Gandhi or Hindu leadership and I referred to the recent correspondence that had passed between Mr. Gandhi and the Viceroy which on the contrary showed that Mr. Gandhi fully maintained his stand of August 8, 1942..."

Jinnah's statement, of course, produced no effect on the *nationalist* press which unashamed continued for a year and half, till the release of Gandhi, propagating the poisonous untruth that Jinnah had gone back on his declaration. It may be noted here that some of the goody-goody Muslims, seldom given to any serious thinking or study of the situation were equally uncomfortable about the whole affair. In the hearts of their hearts they wished Jinnah had not said that. After the release of Gandhi, however, the letter was published in the press. And what was the letter? It said:

Dear Qaid-i-Azam,

I welcome your invitation. I suggest our



umph of Jinnah as the pro-Muslim, and even neutral, press has generally made it out to be.

I adjudge that meeting on a different basis. To me it was a meeting of two phenomena of altogether opposite drifts. Gandhi represents the thousand-year-old suppressed Hindus' urge to own India. The urge had throughout these centuries remained unfulfilled, not because Hindus were any the less brave than others—they would compare the best of fighters—but because they had lacked the great factor of a unifier of national life. All these centuries they never have had any coherent political philosophy, any common ideology, which would fire them with that unquenchable enthusiasm for its pursuit as to give them a singleness of outlook and a uniform national character. Let it be said to the credit of Gandhi that he alone after all these centuries has gone to the point of lending a national character to the Hindus. I shall not discuss what is that which Gandhi has employed to weld Hindus into a nation as they are to-day. We are, however, gravely concerned with the fact that the consummation that Gandhi seeks for Hindu nationhood is Hindudom. Hindudom may be the crowning achievement of Gandhi, but that aim directly comes into conflict with the Mussalmans and what they

stand for, namely, the Islamic way of life. While Hinduism disintegrates society—its caste system is an all-powerful disintegrating factor—Islam unifies people. Gandhi requires to destroy caste system to build up Hindu nationhood; Mussalmans must reinforce Islam to repair the broken limbs of Muslim society. The break-up of Muslim society and nationhood is primarily due to the breach sought to be wrought in the essential unity of Islam as a concept and polity by un-Islamic alien influences. That is to say, Islamic society can be built up anew only by purging Islamic thought of its accretions. That is why we find protestant movements like the Wahabi arising on the firmament of Islamic world. Any effort to erect an Islamic society will be essentially a call back to Islam. That, however, does not mean a medieval civilisation¹ certainly not that. The call back to Islam does not signify revival, but renaissance; that is, reorienting Muslim thought in the light of past history and modern times. Jinnah represents that nascent movement in Indian Islam. Pakistan must involve the cry of 'Back to Islam.'

It is for these reasons that Jinnah and

¹ کوینگے اہل نظر تازہ بستیاں آباد

میری نگاہ نہیں سوئے کوفہ و بغداد

Men of vision will found new cities and new towns,

I never look back to Kufa and Baghdad.

—(Iqbal)

Gandhi are so different. The difference between the two is not the kind of superficial difference that would subsist between any two politicians holding different points of view capable of reconciliation. The difference between Jinnah and Gandhi is essentially the fundamental difference of two ideologies. Gandhi is the product of Hinduism; Jinnah is the child of Islam. And while Hinduism divides humanity into classes, Islam synthesises them into a unity. Thus Jinnah and Gandhi represent the *summum* effect of Islam and Hinduism on their respective mentalities. If Gandhi is a great Hindu, it only means he is most useful to his people; but if Jinnah is a great Muslim, he is the quintessence of human personality. Therefore, is there any wonder that Jinnah and Gandhi could not agree?

Mark the two ideologies at work in their respective demands. While Gandhi's Hinduism wants to grab the entire India for Hindudom, Jinnah's Islam does not allow him to demand more than his share—Pakistan. Muslim Jinnah is not afraid of the three hundred and odd million Hindus ranging themselves against the mere sixty million Muslims of Pakistan, but Hindu Gandhi dreads Pan-Islam. But who can help this difference in outlook? It is inherent in the two ways of life. If you are



indicting Gandhi for narrow-mindedness you are only indicting Hinduism—the stuff he is made of.

In the following correspondence exchanged between the two during their 14-day long meetings is discernible the unmistakable stamp of the two personalities—one clear and courageous, the other vague and fearful. I have arranged the important points discussed in the correspondence in a dialogue form so as to bring out the salient feature of Jinnah's character, namely, his clarity of mind.

JINNAH: With reference to our talk yesterday (September 1), I understood from you that you had come to discuss the Hindu-Muslim settlement with me in your individual capacity, and not in any representative character of capacity, on behalf of the Hindus or the Congress; nor had you any authority to do so. I naturally pointed out to you that there must be someone on the other side with authority holding a representative status with whom I can negotiate and, if possible, come to a settlement of Hindu-Muslim question, and that for the position you had adopted there was no precedent, and that this raises great difficulties in my way. As you know, I can only speak on behalf of Muslim India and the All-India Muslim League, as the president of the organisation which I represent, and as such, I am subject to and governed by its constitution, rules and regulations. I think you realise and will admit that a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim

MY LEADER

question is the foremost and major hurdle and unless the representatives of these two nations put their heads together, how is one to make any headway with it?

GANDHI : I have said in my letter to you, it is implied in the Rajaji formula¹ and I have stated publicly that I have approached you as an individual. My life mission has been Hindu-Muslim unity which I want for its own sake but which is not to be achieved without the foreign ruling Power being

C. R. FORMULA

"Basis for terms of settlement between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League to which Gandhiji and Mr. Jinnah agree and which they will endeavour respectively to get the Congress and the League to approve :

(1) subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitution for Free India, the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for Independence and will co-operate with the Congress in the formation of a provisional interim Government for the transitional period.

(2) After the termination of the war, a commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the north-west and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the inhabitants held on the basis of adult suffrage or other practicable franchise shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the majority decide in favour of forming a sovereign State separate from Hindustan, such decision shall be given effect to, without prejudice to the right of districts on the border to choose to join either State.

(3) It will be open to all parties to advocate their points of view before the plebiscite is held.

(4) In the event of separation, mutual agreements shall be entered into for safeguarding defence, commerce and communications and for other essential purposes.

(5) Any transfer of population shall only be on an absolutely voluntary basis.

(6) These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility of the governance of India."



ousted. Hence the first condition of the exercise of the right of self-determination is achieving Independence by the joint action of all the parties and groups composing India. If such joint action is unfortunately impossible, then too, I must fight with the assistance of such elements as can be brought together.

JINNAH: I explained to you the Lahore Resolution of March, 1940, and tried to persuade you to accept the basic and fundamental principles embodied in it, but you not only refused to consider it but emphasised your opposition to the basis indicated in that resolution, and remarked that there was "an ocean between you and me" and when I asked you what is then the alternative you suggest, you put forward a formula of Mr. Rajagopalacharia approved by you. We discussed it, and as various matters were vague and nebulous, and some required clarification I wanted to have a clear idea of what it really meant and what were its implications, and asked you for explanations and clarification regarding the proposals embodied in that formula. After some discussion, you requested me to formulate in writing my points that I thought required or called for explanation and clarification, and to communicate with you and that you would reply in writing before our next meeting. I am, therefore, submitting to you the following points which require clarification:—

(1) With regard to the preamble: In what capacity will you be a consenting party if any agreement is reached between you and me?

(2) Clause 1: With regard to "the con-

stitution for a free India" referred to in this clause, I would like to know first, what constitution do you refer to, who will frame it, and when will it come into being?

Next, it is stated in the formula that "the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for Independence." Does it mean the Congress demand for Independence as formulated in the August resolution of 1942 by the All-India Congress Committee in Bombay or, if not, what is the significance of this term, for you know the Muslim League has made it clear not only by its resolutions but by its creed, which is embodied in its constitution, that we stand for freedom and independence of the whole of this sub-continent, and that applies to Pakistan and Hindustan.

Next, it is stated that the Muslim League "will co-operate with the Congress in the formation of a provisional interim government for the transitional period." I would like to know the basis or the lines on which such a government is to be set up or constituted. If you have a complete and definite scheme, please let me have it.

(3) Clause 2: Who will appoint the commission referred to in this clause and who will give effect to their findings? What is the meaning of "absolute majority" referred to in it? Will the contemplated plebiscite be taken districtwise or, if not, on what basis? Who will determine and decide whether such a plebiscite should be based on adult franchise or other practicable franchise? Who will give effect to the decision or verdict of the above-mentioned plebiscite? Would only the districts on the border, which are taken



out from the boundaries of the present provinces by delimitation, be entitled to choose to join either state or would also those outside the present boundaries have the right to choose to join either state?

(4) Clause 3: Who are meant by "all parties" in this clause?

(5) Clause 4: I would like to know between whom and through what machinery and agency will the "mutual agreement" referred to in this clause be entered into? What is meant by "safeguarding defence, commerce and communications and for other essential purposes?" Safeguarding against whom?

(6) Clause 6: "These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility for the governance of India." I would like to know to whom is this power to be transferred, through what machinery and agency, and when?

GANDHI: (1) I have already answered this in the foregoing.

(2) The constitution will be framed by the provisional Government contemplated in the formula or an authority specially set up by it after the British power is withdrawn. The Independence contemplated is of the whole of India as it stands. The basis for the formation of the provisional interim government will have to be agreed to between the League and the Congress.

(3) The commission will be appointed by the provisional government. 'Absolute majority' means a clear majority over non-Mus-

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lim elements as in Sind, Baluchistan or the Frontier Province. The form of plebiscite and the franchise must be a matter for discussion.

(4) "All parties" means parties interested.

(5) "Mutual Agreement" means agreement between contracting parties. "Safeguarding defence, etc." means for me a Central or Joint Board of Control. "Safeguarding" means safeguarding against all who may put the common interests in jeopardy.

(6) The power is to be transferred to the nation, that is, to the provisional government. The formula contemplates peaceful transfer by the British Government. So far as I am concerned I would like the transfer to take place as early as possible.

JINNAH: I urged on you that the only solution of India's problem is to accept the division of India as Pakistan and Hindustan, as briefly laid down in the Lahore Resolution of March 1940, and proceed to settle the details forthwith. You say the Lahore Resolution is indefinite. You never asked me for any clarification or explanation of the terms of the resolution but you really indicated your emphatic opposition to the very basis and the fundamental principles embodied in it. I would, therefore, like to know in what way or respect the Lahore Resolution is indefinite. I cannot agree that Rajaji has taken from it its substance and given it shape. On the contrary, he has not only put it out of shape but mutilated it, as I explained in my speech which I delivered at the meeting of the Council of the All-India Muslim League at Lahore on July 30, 1944.



You say, "The first condition of the exercise of the right of self-determination is achieving Independence by the joint action of all the parties and groups composing India. If such joint action is unfortunately impossible then too I must fight with the assistance of such elements as can be brought together." This, in my opinion is, as I have repeatedly said, putting the cart before the horse, and is generally opposed to the policy and declaration of the All-India Muslim League, and you are only holding on firmly to the August Resolution of 1942. In order to achieve the freedom and independence of the people of India, it is essential, in the first instance, that there should be a Hindu-Muslim settlement.

GANDHI : For the moment I have shunted the Rajaji formula and, with your assistance, am applying my mind very seriously to the famous Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League.

You must admit that the resolution itself makes no reference to the two-nation theory. In the course of our discussions you have passionately pleaded that India contains two nations, i.e., Hindus and Muslims, and that the latter have their homelands in India as the former have theirs.

The more our argument progresses the more alarming your picture appears to me. It would be alluring if it were true. But my fear is growing that it is wholly unreal. *I find no parallel in history for a body of converts and their descendants claiming to be a nation apart from the parent stock. If India was one nation before the advent of Islam, it*

must remain one in spite of the change of faith of a very large body of her children.

You do not claim to be a separate nation by right of conquest but by reason of acceptance of Islam. Will the two nations become one if the whole of India accepted Islam? Will Bengalis, Oriyas, Andhras, Tamilians Maharashtrians, Gujratis, etc., cease to have their special characteristics if all of them became converts to Islam?

These have all become one politically because they are subject to one foreign control. They are trying to-day to throw off that subjection.

You seem to have introduced a new test of nationhood. If I accept it, I would have to subscribe to many more claims and face an insoluble problem.

The only real though lawful test of our nationhood arises out of our common political subjection. If you and I throw off this subjection by our combined effort we shall be born a politically free nation out of our travail. If by then we have not learnt to prize our freedom, we may quarrel among ourselves and, for want of a common master holding us together in his iron grip, seek to split up into small groups or nationalities. There will be nothing to prevent us from descending to that level and we shall not have to go in search of a master. There are many claimants to the throne that never remains vacant.

With this background I shall present you with my difficulty in accepting your resolution :

(1) Pakistan is not in the resolution. Does

it bear the original meaning—the Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan, out of which the name was mnemonically formed? If not, what is it?

(2) Is the goal of Pakistan pan-Islam?

(3) What is it that distinguishes an Indian Muslim from every other Indian, if not his religion? Is he different from a Turk or an Arab?

(4) What is the connotation of the word "Muslim" in the resolution under discussion? Does it mean the Muslims of India of geography or of the Pakistan to be?

(5) Is the resolution addressed to Muslims by way of education, or to the inhabitants of the whole of India by way of appeal or to the foreign rulers as an ultimatum?

(6) Are the constituents in the two zones to constitute "Independent States" an undefined number in each zone?

(7) Is the demarcation to take place during the pendency of British rule?

(8) If the answer to the last question is in the affirmative, the proposal must be accepted first by Britain and then imposed upon India, not evolved from within by the free will of the people of India...

(9) Have you examined the position and satisfied yourself that these "Independent States" will be materially and otherwise benefited by being split up into fragments.

(10) Please satisfy me that these independent sovereign States will not become a collection of poor States, a menace to themselves and to the rest of India.

(11) Pray show me by facts and figures or otherwise how independence and welfare of India as a whole can be brought about by the acceptance of the resolution?

(12) How are Muslims under the Princes to be disposed of as a result of this scheme?

(13) What is your definition of "minorities"?

(14) Will you please define the "adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards" for minorities referred to in the second part of the Resolution?

(15) Do you not see that the Lahore Resolution contains only a bare statement of the objective and does not give any idea as to the means to be adopted for the execution of the idea and the concrete corollaries thereof?

For instance :

(a) Are the people in the regions falling under the plan to have any voice in the matter of separation and, if so, how is it to be ascertained?

(b) What is the provision for defence and similar matters of common concern contemplated in the Lahore Resolution?

(c) There are many groups of Muslims who have continuously expressed dissent from the policy of the League. While I am prepared to accept the preponderating influence and position of the League and have approached you for that very reason, is it not our joint duty to remove their doubts and carry them with us by making them feel that they and their supporters have not been practically disfranchised?



(d) Does this not lead again to placing the Resolution of the League before the people of the zones concerned as a whole for acceptance?

As I write this letter and imagine the working of the resolution in practice, I see nothing but ruin for the whole India. Believe me, I approach you as a seeker. Though I represent nobody but myself, I aspire to represent all the inhabitants of India. For, I realise in my own person their misery and degradation which is their common lot irrespective of class, caste or creed. I know that you have acquired a unique hold on the Muslim masses. I want to use your influence for their total welfare, which must include the rest.

JINNAH: The third paragraph of your letter is not seeking clarification but a disquisition and expression of your views on the point whether the Mussalmans are a nation. This matter can hardly be discussed by means of correspondence. There is a great deal of discussion and literature on this point which is available, and it is for you to judge finally when you have studied this question thoroughly, whether the Mussalmans and Hindus are not two major nations in this sub-continent. . . . We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hundred million, and, what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilisation, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of a value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions; in

short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law we are a nation. Now I shall reply to your various points :

(1) Yes, the word "Pakistan" is not mentioned in the resolution, and it does not bear the original meaning. The word has now become synonymous with the Lahore Resolution.

(2) This point does not arise, but still I reply that the question is a mere bogey.

(3) This point is covered by my answer that the Mussalmans of India are a nation. As to the last part of your query, it is hardly relevant to the matter of clarification of the resolution.

(4) Surely you know what the word "Muslims" means.

(5) This point does not arise by way of clarification of the text of the Lahore Resolution.

(6) No. They will form units of Pakistan.

(7) As soon as the basis and the principle embodied in the Lahore Resolution are accepted, the question of demarcation will have to be taken up immediately.

(8) In view of my reply to (7), your question (8) has been answered.

(9) Does not relate to clarification.

(10) My answer to (9) covers this point.

(11) Does not arise out of the clarification of the resolution. Surely this is not asking for clarification of the resolution. I have in numerous speeches of mine and the Muslim League in its resolutions have pointed out



that this is the only solution of India's problem and the road to achieve freedom and independence of the peoples of India.

(12) "Muslims under the Princes": The Lahore Resolution is only confined to British India. This question does not arise out of the clarification of the resolution.

(13) The definition of "minorities": You yourself have often said "minorities" means "accepted minorities."

(14) The adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards for minorities, referred to in the resolution, are a matter for negotiation and settlement with the minorities in the respective States, viz., Pakistan and Hindustan.

(15) It does give basic principles, and when they are accepted, then the details will have to be worked out by the contracting parties.

(a) Does not arise by way of clarification.

(b) Does not arise by way of clarification.

(c) The Muslim League is the only authoritative and representative organisation of Muslim India.

(d) No ; see answer (c).

As regards your final paragraph, before receiving clarification from me you have already passed your judgment and condemned the Lahore Resolution, when you say, "As I write this letter and imagine the working of the resolution in practice, I see nothing but ruin for the whole of India?" I understand that you have made clear to me that you represent nobody but yourself, and I am trying to persuade you and to convert you that this is the road which will lead us to the achieve-

ment of freedom and independence not only of the two major nations, Hindus and Muslims, but of the rest of the peoples of India, *but when you proceed to say that you aspire to represent all the inhabitants of India, I regret I cannot accept that statement of yours.*

It is quite clear that you represent nobody else but the Hindus, and as long as you do not realise your true position and the realities, it is very difficult for me to argue with you, and it becomes still more difficult for me to persuade you, and hope to convert you to the realities and the actual conditions prevailing in India to-day.

GANDHI: Can we not agree to differ on the question of "two nations" and yet solve the problem on the basis of self-determination? It is this basis that has brought me to you. If the regions holding Muslim majorities have to be separated according to the Lahore Resolution, the grave step of separation should be specifically placed before and approved by the people in that area.

JINNAH: It seems to me that you are labouring under some misconception of the real meaning of the word "self-determination." Apart from the inconsistencies and contradictions of the various positions that you have adopted in the course of our correspondence, as indicated above, can you not appreciate our point of view that *we claim the right of self-determination as a nation and not as a territorial unit, and that we are entitled to exercise our inherent right as a Muslim nation, which is our birth-right?* Whereas you are labouring under the wrong idea that "self-determination" means only that of a "territorial unit," which, by the way, is neither



demarcated not defined yet, and there is no union or federal constitution of India in being, functioning as a sovereign Central government. *Ours is a case of division and carving out two independent sovereign States by way of settlement between two major nations, Hindus and Muslims, and not of severance or secession from any existing union, which is non est in India.* The right of self-determination, which we claim, postulates that we are a nation, and as such it would be the self-determination of the Muslims, and they alone are entitled to exercise that right.

GANDHI : Your letter shows a wide divergence of opinion and outlook between us. Thus you adhere to the opinion often expressed by you that the August 1942 Resolution is "inimical to the ideals and demands of Muslim India." There is no proof for this sweeping statement.

JINNAH : I am really surprised when you say there is no proof of what you characterise as a sweeping statement of mine, that the August 1942 Resolution is inimical to the ideals and demands of Muslim India. The resolution in its essence is as follows :

(a) immediate grant of complete Independence and setting up immediately of a federal Central government on the basis of a united, democratic Government of India with federated units or provinces, which means establishing a Hindu raj.

(b) that this National Government so set up will evolve a scheme for a constituent assembly, which will be chosen by adult franchise, which will prepare a constitution for the Government of India, which means



that the constituent assembly chosen will be composed of an overwhelming majority of Hindus, nearly 75 per cent.

(c) to enforce this demand of the Congress the August resolution decides on and sanctions a resort to mass civil disobedience at your command and when ordered by you as the sole dictator of the Congress.

This demand is basically and fundamentally opposed to the ideals and demands of Muslim India of Pakistan, as embodied in the Lahore Resolution, and to enforce such a demand by means of resort to mass civil disobedience is inimical to the ideals and demands of Muslim India; and if you succeed in realising this demand, it would be a death-blow to Muslim India. I see from the correspondence and talks between you and me that you are still holding fast to this fateful resolution.

* * *

You say: "I have therefore suggested a way out. Let it be a partition as between two brothers, if a division there must be." I really do not know what this means, and I would like you to elaborate this proposal and give me some rough outlines of this new idea of yours as to how and when the division is to take place, and in what way it is different from the division envisaged by the Lahore Resolution.

(2) You say: "Let us call in a third party or parties to guide or even arbitrate between us." May I point out that you have repeatedly made clear to me that you are having these talks as an individual seeker. How can any question of a third party or



parties to guide or arbitrate between us arise ?

GANDHI: Differing from you on the general basis, I can yet recommend to the Congress and the country the acceptance of the claim for separation contained in the Muslim League Resolution of Lahore of 1940, on my basis and on the following terms :

The areas should be demarcated by a commission approved by the Congress and the League. The wishes of the inhabitants of the areas demarcated should be ascertained through the votes of the adult population of the areas or through some equivalent method.

If the vote is in favour of separation, it shall be agreed that these areas shall form a separate State as soon as possible after India is free from foreign domination and can therefore be constituted into two sovereign independent States.

There shall be a treaty of separation which should also provide for the efficient and satisfactory administration of foreign affairs, defence, internal communications, customs, commerce and the like, which must necessarily continue to be matters of common interest between the contracting parties.

The treaty shall also contain terms for safeguarding the rights of minorities in the two States.

Immediately on the acceptance of this agreement by the Congress and the League, the two shall decide upon a common course of action for the attainment of Independence of India.



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The League will, however, be free to remain out of any direct action to which the Congress may resort and in which the League may not be willing to participate.

If you do not agree to these terms, could you let me know in precise terms what you would have me to accept in terms of the Lahore Resolution and bind myself to recommend to the Congress? If you could kindly do this, I shall be able to see, apart from the difference in approach, what definite terms I can agree to. In your letter of September 23, you refer to "the basic and fundamental principles embodied in the Lahore Resolution," and ask me to accept them. Surely this is unnecessary when, as I feel, I have accepted the concrete consequence that should follow from such acceptance.

JINNAH: You do not accept that the Mussalmans of India are a nation.

You do not accept that the Mussalmans have an inherent right of self-determination.

You do not accept that they alone are entitled to exercise this right of theirs for self-determination.

You do not accept that Pakistan is composed of two zones, North-West and North-East, comprising six provinces, namely, Sind, Baluchistan, North-West Frontier Province, the Punjab, Bengal and Assam, subject to territorial adjustments that may be agreed upon, as indicated in the Lahore Resolution. The matter of demarcating and defining the territories can be taken up after the fundamentals above-mentioned are accepted and



for that purpose machinery may be set up by agreement.

You do not accept the provisions embodied in the Lahore Resolution for safeguarding the minorities, and yet in your letter under reply you say: "With your assistance, I am exploring the possibilities of reaching an agreement so that the claim embodied in the Muslim League Resolution of Lahore may be reasonably satisfied," and proceed to say, "You must, therefore, have no apprehensions that the August resolution will stand in the way of our reaching an agreement."

I have already clearly explained to you that the August resolution, so long as it stands, is a bar, for it is fundamentally opposed to the Lahore Resolution. You then proceed to say: "That resolution dealt with the question of India as against Britain, and it cannot stand in the way of our settlement." I am not at present concerned with Britain, but the August resolution, as I have already stated, is against the ideals and demands of Muslim League. Further, there is the resolution of Jagat Narain Lal, passed by the All-India Congress Committee in May 1942 at Allahabad, which, in express terms, lays down as follows:

"The A.-I.C.C. is of opinion that any proposal to disintegrate India by giving liberty to any component State or territorial unit to secede from the Indian Union or Federation will be highly detrimental to the best interests of the people of the different States and Provinces and the country as a whole and the Congress, therefore, cannot agree to any such proposal."

These two resolutions, so long as they stand, are a complete bar to any settlement on the basis of the division of India as Pakistan and Hindustan.

* * *

Now let me take your main terms :

(a) "I proceed on the assumption that India is not to be regarded as two or more nations but as one family consisting of many members of whom the Muslims living in the north-west zones, i.e., Baluchistan, Sind, North-West Frontier Province and that part of Punjab where they are in absolute majority over all the other elements, and in parts of Bengal and Assam where they are in absolute majority, desire to live in separation from the rest of India." If this term were accepted and given effect to, the present boundaries of these Provinces would be maimed and mutilated beyond redemption and leave us only with the husk, and it is opposed to the Lahore Resolution.

(b) That even in those mutilated areas so defined, the right of self-determination will not be exercised by the Muslims but by the inhabitants of those areas so demarcated. This again is opposed to the fundamentals of the Lahore Resolution.

(c) That if the vote is in favour of separation, they shall be allowed to "form a separate State as soon as possible after India is free from foreign domination." Whereas we propose that we should come to a complete settlement of our own immediately, and by our united front and efforts do everything in our power to secure the freedom and indepen-



dence of the peoples of India on the basis of Pakistan and Hindustan.

(d) Next you say, "There shall be a treaty of separation which should also provide for the efficient and satisfactory administration of foreign affairs, defence, internal communications, customs, commerce, and the like, which must necessarily continue to be matters of common interest between the contracting parties." If these vital matters are to be administered by some Central authority, you do not indicate what sort of authority or machinery will be set up to administer these matters, and how and to whom again that authority will be responsible. According to the Lahore Resolution, as I have already explained to you, all these matters, which are the life-blood of any State, cannot be delegated to any Central authority of government. The matter of security of the two States and the natural and mutual obligations that may arise out of physical contiguity will be for the constitution-making body of Pakistan and that of Hindustan, or other party concerned, to deal with on the footing of their being two independent States. As regards the safeguarding of the rights of minorities, I have already explained that this question of safeguarding the minorities is fully stated in the Lahore Resolution.

* * *

I cannot agree with you when you finally wind up by saying: "In your letter of September 23, you refer to the basis and fundamental principles embodied in the Lahore Resolution and ask me to accept them. Surely this is unnecessary when, as I feel, I

have accepted the concrete consequence, that should follow from such acceptance. This is obviously far from correct. Why not then accept the fundamentals of the Lahore Resolution and proceed to settle the details?

I have said that Jinnah and Gandhi are two phenomena of opposite drifts. The correspondence brings out the truth of this statement in the clearest possible terms. Here we find that while Jinnah passionately claims to belong to a separate and distinct nation, Gandhi refers to him as a mere 'convert' who must remain bound in slavery to Hindu majority. That is the genius of Hinduism. It stands for the privilege of one class. Others are either Scheduled castes or outcaste. Gandhi wonders how mere conversion could wrest the Muslims from the 'parent stock.' His wonder is understandable in view of his aim—which is the establishment of Hindudom. Gandhi wants to allot the same position to Muslims under Hindudom as at present enjoyed by the sixty million untouchables,—also the children of the 'parent stock.' But even as Gandhi is determined to instal Hinduism in supreme seat of power in India, Jinnah is inflexibly resolved not to submit to it. On the contrary, he is determined to establish the supremacy of Islam in his own homelands. The point is transparently clear in the correspondence.

It needs a great man to take firm deci-



sions, but it takes a superman to stick to them. Jinnah represents the tenacity of purpose of a superman. Mark how he understands what is the primary aim before him. His eye is fixed on the main issue. He does not allow himself by hair's breadth to deviate from the main point. He does not permit Gandhi to confuse the issue by propositions like 'partition as brothers' and 'territorial self-determination'. *Straight to the point*, that is the rule. Hindu politicians are in the habit of 'indirect' approach: hence their inability to understand the simplicity and clarity of Jinnah's case. They suspect him of hiding something. They declare: 'Pakistan is a counter for bargaining.' Thus they merely betray their own duplicity of mind. Clear enunciation of aims and programmes is not the *forte* of Hindu politicians. That is why they despair of Jinnah, whose meanings you can neither mistake nor divert him from his aim. "He is *the* incorruptible politician *par excellence*."

Again, Jinnah-Gandhi meeting was not a meeting between two politicians. From Gandhi's point of view it was his last fierce onslaught on the 'Jinnah citadel.' So far his weapons had been denunciation. Now he chose the weapon of blandishment. Do you see, he himself went to Jinnah. (The whole Congress press was at pains to bring this

point to the fore to show how humble the Mahatma is.) The Mahatma is known to possess great powers of persuasion. Armed with that power, and the halo of an humble saint, he went to Jinnah to convert him to his own creed, which, in Gandhian cult, purports to be simple dictation. Had he not brought so many down to his own point of view? Perhaps a meeting as a 'seeker' after truth with Jinnah might do the same trick as did the Fast unto Death at Poona with Ambedkar. Gandhi's meeting with Jinnah was one of his 'fast-kind' methods for the same purpose, namely, to destroy the other's case by underhand means. Ambedkar rues the day he signed the Poona Pact. But Gandhi forgot one thing. His spell is effective only over those who accept it. It is bound to fail with anyone who does not worship the Gandhian cult.

ایں صنم تا سجدہ اش کردی خداست

چوں یکے اندر قیام آئی فناست

So long you worship it, this idol is God,
But the moment you stand erect, it is dead.

Therefore, Gandhi could not expect Jinnah who owes allegiance to one God but to judge him on the score of common-sense. Jinnah rejected Gandhi's proposals on that very score. The fact of his having stuck to the common-sense course of thought in face of Gandhi's widely advertised hypnotism bears



an eloquent testimony to the great personality of Jinnah.

His unflinching resolve to fight for his goal makes him fearless of all opposition. He openly declared it to Gandhi: "If one does not agree with you or differs from you, you are always right and other party is always wrong, and the next thing is that many are waiting prepared, in your circle, to pillory me when the word goes, *but I must face all threats and consequences, and I can only act according to my judgment and conscience.*"

Gandhi had complained in his speech on the August 8, 1942 Resolution that Jinnah was 'vain.' Gandhi only meant to say that Jinnah does not bow to him. Jinnah's 'vanity' has made every Muslim raise his head erect. One man has raised the whole body of his followers to a status of respectability. Not in vain did the late Allama Iqbal address it to Jinnah: "... You are the only Muslim in India to-day to whom the community has a right to look up for safe guidance through the storm ..."

It is impossible to overemphasise the importance of Jinnah's role in our time. In one word, he symbolises the stubborn nature of Islam in the face of invasions. Surrounded by anti-Islamic forces, Jinnah has stood like a rock. He began his organisational work with the words: "You will never be

able to destroy that culture which we have inherited, the Islamic culture, and that spirit will live, is going to live and has lived. You may overpower us; you may oppress us; and you can do your worst. But we have come to the conclusion and we have now made the grim resolve that we shall go down, if we have to go, fighting." These words were addressed to the Congress Party in 1939. To-day is 1945—an elapse of six years—and can anyone now doubt that the Mussalmans shall not allow themselves to be oppressed, they shall not go down?

Jinnah has organised the Mussalmans and given them a goal. Indeed the change Jinnah has wrought in the Muslim thought and body-politic is tremendous. No one ever before has touched the Muslim mind so deeply.

In 1931 the great Iqbal could only visualise the consolidation of Muslim provinces in the north-west into a single *bloc* with the utmost autonomy and minimum powers at the Centre. He could go no further. He could not go further, not because he lacked imagination, but that the Muslim state of disorganisation was extremely appalling. So much so that even this proposal was ridiculed as a poet's phantasy. To-day Pakistan is a practical proposition. The Mussalmans shall be content with nothing less. In the words



of Beverly Nichols: "The dream empire may one day come out of the clouds, and place itself on the world's map with a bang." That is what Muslim determination has now to teach a foreign journalist. Jinnah has changed the phantasy into a fact.

Jinnah is sometimes described as too rigid, too matter-of-fact, too unimaginative, too much struck to the present, too fond of legalities and so unable to look far ahead of him. True, Jinnah is all these. But that is exactly where he makes a difference over the host of Muslim leaders of the Khilafat days whose too great imaginativeness led them to gloss over minor details and moves of the burning *present* which spelt such complete ruin of the entire Muslim body-politic in the *future*. Jinnah prefers to be awake. He takes cognisance of every minor point and each small move, for he knows that it is these details which cut the shape of things to come. Future is born out of the womb of the present. That is why Jinnah takes a good care of the present. But it is wrong to say that Jinnah is without imagination. He has his imagination. Even he has his dreams. I shall here record just one minor incident in his life to illustrate my point.

It was in the autumn of 1942. Jinnah was touring the Punjab. I was reporting his activities for *Dawn*. Before the conclusion

of the tour we were at Lahore. Jinnah was given a tea party. At that tea party someone suggested to him that he should visit the grave of the late Allama Iqbal. He was ready. Taking leave of his hosts, he got ready to go. Half an hour later, five people quietly got out of two cars and stood by the grave of the great poet, thinker, sage and philosopher of Islam. It was dusk. There was chill in the air. Jinnah stood motionless and said his *fateha*. He was in a reflective mood and every one held his breath. It was a strange meeting between the poet who had dreamt, cried and gone and the man whom his vision had marked out to be the only one who could guide the Mussalmans through their 'serious juncture.' What was Jinnah thinking? He just stood. I was overawed by the occasion. The great Shahi Mosque was silent. Its minarets were in splinters. Did they not strike a resemblance to Jinnah's work? He was also in the process of constructing a building for the Mussalmans to live in. Then quietly we moved away from the grave. No one spoke. And then one of us mustered courage and addressed to Jinnah one of Iqbal's verses; also said something about Islam and the world. Abruptly Jinnah halted and said: "My friend, Pakistan holds the key to the liberation of the entire Islamic world." I had never seen him in such a visible



emotion. Jinnah has his dreams.

Mullaism has much maligned Jinnah. But he has only sought to change their sense of values. "I am not a learned Maulana or Maulvi (he once declared). Nor do I claim to be learned in theology. But I also know a little of my faith and I am a humble and proud follower of my faith." That is, Jinnah pleaded with them not to insist on the people to come up to their old standard of things, but rather judge them on this and this standard alone that they are loyal to Islam and Mussalmans and do not owe allegiance to any one else. That provides a moment for reflection to those who profess love and loyalty for Islam but actually follow the dictates of the enemies of Islam. Profession and practice must be interrelated.

A saviour of Mussalmans, Jinnah is unique in Indian politics. For more than thirty years now he has played one important role after another and no one can conscientiously accuse him of a single dishonest thought or a single dishonest move. It is an abominable lie to say that he has turned against the freedom of India. Jinnah is as much dedicated to the freedom of India to-day as he was ever before. Indeed he is the only man who has stuck fast to this ideal in Indian politics. Only he has become clearer as to what should that freedom mean to the Indian

Mussalmans. If that is his sin, he pleads guilty to the charge; in that respect he is the 'sindest soul alive.'

If freedom means the giving up of Islam—as it is bound to mean under the hegemony of Hindu numbers—surely Jinnah is resolved to remain a Muslim first, a Muslim second and a Muslim last. He shall never give up his rich heritage of Islam.

As an Indian, he is merely a consummate politician, but as a Mussalman, he is a world-force, not only in terms of leading the solid body of hundred million Mussalmans but most of all as the builder of a new society under nascent Islam. If ever Islam is bound to come to its own, it is to-day. It is to-day when distances have been annihilated space-sense gone and the world really become one that Islamic brotherhood *must* become a reality.

What this world brotherhood requires is the reconstruction of Islamic thought and society in the light of modernism, and that work can be pre-eminently performed by Indian Mussalmans. Unhandicapped by any vested interests, they alone are best fitted to experiment reorientation of thought. Jinnah is at the helm of such a body of men.

If Jinnah succeeds in building up an Islamic State in India—his success is entirely dependent on the amount of support he gets



from the Mussalmans—he would be in a position to perform the boldest experiment in the history of Islam and the greatest revolution of all times.

That makes the duty of Mussalmans clear. Will they shoulder the great responsibility Jinnah has placed on them? Or will they fail? That is the question. The answer will determine the nature and scope of the revolution Jinnah has it in him to bring about in our times.

TO MY MIND, IF THE INDIAN MUSSALMANS HAVE NOT YET TOO FAR SINNED AGAINST THEMSELVES; IF GOD HAS NOT ALREADY ORDAINED TO RAISE ANOTHER PEOPLE TO UPHOLD THE BANNER OF ISLAM, THE MUSSALMANS SHALL SURELY RALLY ROUND JINNAH IN EVER-INCREASING FORCE AND ACHIEVE THE GOAL THAT HE HAS SET BEFORE THEM.

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